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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objec-
tive of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an inflation targeting sys-
tem, the Bank seeks to attain price stability by implementing a gradual, but firm disinflation programme over the
course of several years.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive
review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the monetary conditions
that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration of
a wide range of factors. These include an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook,
money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance transparency,
the Bank publishes all the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Quarterly
Report on Inflation presents the forecasts prepared by the Economics Department for the anticipated developments
in inflation and the macroeconomic events underlying the forecast.
Starting from November 2003, the Quarterly Report on Inflation focuses more clearly on the MNB staff’s expert
analysis of expected inflation developments and the related macroeconomic events. The forecasts and distribution
of uncertainties surrounding the forecasts reflect the expert opinion of the Economics Department. The forecasts of
the Economics Department continue to be based on certain assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecast, the
Economics Department assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of economic variables exoge-
nous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics Department staff under the general direction of Ágnes
CSERMELY, Head of Department. The project was managed by Barnabás FERENCZI, Deputy Head of the Economics
Department, together with Attila CSAJBÓK, Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, 
Mihály András KOVÁCS, Deputy Head of the Conjunctural Assessment and Projections Division, and Zoltán M.
JAKAB, Head of the Model Development Unit. The Report was approved for publication by István HAMECZ,
Managing Director.
Primary contributors to this Report also include Zoltán GYENES, Zoltán M. JAKAB, Péter KARÁDI, Gábor KÁTAY,
Gergely KISS, Mihály András KOVÁCS, Judit KREKÓ, Zsolt LOVAS, András OSZLAY, Klára PINTÉR, Gábor PULA,
András REZESSY, Gábor VADAS, Barnabás VIRÁG and Balázs VONNÁK. Other contributors to the analyses and fore-
casts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics Department and the Monetary Instruments and
Markets Department. Translated by Andrea HORVÁTH, Éva LI, Edit MISKOLCZY and Éva TAMÁSI.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the MNB’s other departments as well as the Monetary Council’s com-
ments and suggestions following its meetings on 2 and 16 August 2004. However, the projections and policy con-
siderations reflect the views of the Economics Department staff and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary
Council or the MNB.
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OVERVIEW
Changes to the Report’s
structure
Increase in the risk premi-
um in May and June did
not lead to depreciation of
the forint
Rising yields
Improved end-of-period
risk perception
Inflation accelerated in
2004 Q2
Wage inflation accelerated
Demand-pull inflationary
pressure eased temporarily
Contradictory inflation
expectations
Having reviewed the experience of the past three years of the inflation targeting sys-
tem, we arrived at the conclusion that changes to the structure of the Quarterly
Report on Inflation might render it easier to follow. Our Report, now featuring a new
structure, presents our projections in a more unified framework than previously, dis-
cussing the inflation outlook in one part (Section 3), after an analysis of the financial
markets (Section 1) and recent macroeconomic developments (Section 2).
Underlying technical details of the projections, fiscal deficit indicators, and expect-
ed developments in external balance continue to be included in Special topics
(Section 4).
In May and June, risk premia on forint-denominated investments rose. The underlying
reason for this development was the worsening perception of Hungarian economic
trends, in particular external balance. Expectations about the beginning of the US inter-
est rate cycle and related lower global risk appetite were perceptible during the period,
mainly in April and May. The increase in risk premia occurred without a sustained
decline in the exchange rate of the forint, materialising in higher forint yields.
Rising yields in May affected the entire length of the yield curve. As of June, the dete-
riorating risk perception was mainly reflected in higher interest rate expectations for
the coming 3–4 years. A monetary policy maintaining the key policy rate and cen-
tral bank communication pointing out equilibrium-related problems and urging cau-
tion may have both contributed to the relative stability of the exchange rate and
helped put an end to the rise in long-term interest rates.
Risk perception improved somewhat in the second half of July, primarily due to glob-
al and regional influences. Yields declined at all maturities, with the exchange rate
of the forint appreciating. Nonetheless, yields are still higher than in early May. 
In 2004 Q2, CPI and core inflation stood at 7.3 and 6.2 per cent respectively, sug-
gesting an acceleration of inflation, relative to Q1. The increase in inflation com-
pared to 2003 can be attributed mainly to rises in indirect taxes in early 2004.
Furthermore, unprocessed food and motor fuel prices also boosted inflation consid-
erably in Q2.
Of the major supply side factors affecting inflation in 2004 H1, high wage inflation
in the private sector, in addition to a rise in indirect taxes, should be pointed out.
Buoyant external economic activity, a sharp increase in productivity and a structur-
al labour shortage are all likely to have contributed to stronger wage growth.
Although high wage inflation boosted cost-push inflation, a sharp rise in productivi-
ty and the forint’s higher exchange rate relative to last year may have helped offset
this development.
In terms of demand side trends, the delayed impact on inflation of the exceptional-
ly sharp rise in consumption between 2001 and mid-2003 may have been a domi-
nant factor in early 2004 H1, while in Q2, this factor may have been offset by a slow-
down in consumption, which helped to reduce inflation.
Information on inflation expectations is contradictory: while market analysts and
research institutes revised up their expectations for both 2004 and 2005, the infla-
tion expectations of households and corporate managers were somewhat more
favourable.
OVERVIEW
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Projection is based on
unchanged monetary 
conditions
A temporary pick-up, 
followed by stable 
economic growth
Export markets expected
to expand
Buoyant corporate 
investment activity, with
household and general
government investment
activity waning
Initially, consumption
slows down, then picks up
Fiscal tightening remains
significant in 2004
Initially negative, then
positive net exports
Recovery in labour
demand with supply 
constraints leads to high
wage inflation
Prior to early 2005, 
disinflation is expected 
to be first significant then 
moderate
In keeping with earlier practice, our projection presented in the Report is based on
unchanged monetary conditions (exchange rate and interest rate). With respect to
fiscal policy, due to the lack of an approved budget for 2005, we assume a 0.5 per
cent decrease in the ESA-based deficit for 2005, based on the Government’s
Convergence Programme. A gradual decline in oil prices, inferred from futures
prices, is another major assumption in the forecast.
This year’s trends in the global and domestic business cycle will result in a significant
3.8 per cent rate of economic growth. In 2005, growth is expected to taper off to
3.6 per cent. This initially faster growth, followed by stabilisation, is attributable pre-
dominantly to developments in investment.
Export markets are expected to expand dynamically over the forecast horizon. This
will lead to a robust rise in exports, which may be further strengthened by the recent
improvement in manufacturing productivity.
The upturn in the business cycle encourages corporate sector investment, which
is further supported by the fact that companies are increasingly substituting
labour with capital. While household investment has been declining consistent-
ly since the tightening of the subsidised housing finance scheme, the effect of
this trend will only be perceptible late in the year. General government invest-
ment will slow markedly in 2005. Overall, whole-economy fixed investment is
expected to grow dynamically this year and less vigorously in 2005.
Households’ disposable income and household consumption will grow relatively
moderately in 2004. Gradual improvement in income positions points to a moder-
ate pick-up in consumption later on. Trends indicate a gradual increase in house-
holds’ net financial savings in the future.
General government dampens aggregate demand this year, as demand contraction
in 2004 may amount to slightly more than 1.5 per cent of GDP, in order to reduce
the fiscal deficit. Our basic assumption is for a normative 0.5 per cent decline in the
ESA deficit in 2005.
Owing to the strong impact of domestic demand (and in particular dynamic invest-
ment activity) on imports, net exports will have a slightly negative impact on growth
in 2004, despite exhibiting rapid growth. In 2005, however, net exports will make a
positive contribution to growth.
The favourable business cycle conditions are also expected to stimulate corporate
labour demand. Nevertheless, a number of factors will likely impede dynamic
growth in employment. High wage inflation in recent years has encouraged capi-
tal-labour substitution, and certain sectors are already experiencing a structural
labour shortage. As a consequence, higher corporate sector output is accompa-
nied with fairly moderate growth in employment. Based on the assumed fiscal
path, general government employment is assumed to decline, with general gov-
ernment wages increasing at a more moderate pace than seen in the private sec-
tor.
In our main scenario, disinflation will be rather significant in late 2004 and early
2005. By contrast, from 2005 Q2 onwards, it is expected to slow down gradually
and remain moderate. Provided that our basic assumptions apply, consumer price
inflation is expected to stand at around 6 per cent at year-end 2004, and between
4 to 5 per cent in 2005. While in May we anticipated inflation at year-end 2005 to
be in the middle of the target zone, our current projection is for inflation to be in
the upper section of the target range, with the balance of risks slightly on the upside.
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Disinflation this year will be essentially attributable to regulated and unprocessed
food prices. No significant decline in core inflation is expected to occur yet.
In early 2005, however, both CPI and core inflation will decelerate considerably as
a result of the exclusion of the impact of rises in indirect taxes from the base. Aside
from the base effects, we anticipate only gradual disinflation next year. On the sup-
ply side, a drop in unit wage costs will help reduce inflation. Furthermore, assumed
developments in oil prices, competition in the market of unprocessed food and a
below-average expected rise in regulated prices all contribute to lower inflation next
year.
Our outlook for economic activity points to stronger demand-pull inflationary pres-
sure. Aggregate demand side factors and the widening of the output gap somewhat
offset supply side effects.
Overall, in view of the above influences, we have revised up our inflation projection
for end-2005 relative to the previous Report, reflecting somewhat lower risks to the
central projection.
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Core inflation does not
slow this year significantly
In 2005 Q1, the impact 
of indirect tax hikes will
drop out. Supply side
trends will lower inflation,
with demand factors
becoming more important
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Summary table of the main scenario
(Projections are conditional, with the main scenario reflecting the projection that applies if all of the assumptions
presented in Section 3 materialise; 
unless otherwise specified, changes on a year earlier in per cent.)
2002 2003 2004 2005
Actual/Estimate Forecast in the main scenario
CPI
December 4.8 5.7 6.1 4.4
Annual average 5.3 4.7 6.9 4.5
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.8 0.6 1.9 2.2
Household consumption 9.3 6.5 2.2 2.5
Gross fixed capital formation 8.0 3.0 11.4 3.9
Domestic absorption 5.4 5.5 4.4 2.8
Exports 3.7 7.2 12.2 9.5
Imports 6.2 10.3 12.3 8.2
GDP 3.5 2.9 3.8 3.6
Current account deficit
As a per cent of GDP 7.1 8.9 8.8 8.0
EUR billions 4.9 6.5 7.2 7.0
General government
ESA-based deficit as a per cent of GDP1 9.3 5.9 5.4 4.9
Demand impact2 4.2 (-0.1) (-1.7) (-0.3)
Labour market
Whole-economy total wage inflation3 15.8 10.9 9.5 8.5
Whole-economy total employment4 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.2
Private sector wage inflation5 12.3 8.7 10.2 9.2
Private sector unit labour cost5 5.5 4.4 5.9 4.8
Private sector employment4 (-0.4) 0.7 1.1 0.4
Real disposable income of households6 11.8 8.1 2.5 3.6
1 For 2005, we assume a conditional path, based on Convergence Programme submitted to the European Commission, which assumes a 0.5 per-
cent decline in the ESA-based deficit compared to 2004. 
2 Change in the SNA primary balance, corrected for the effects of payments to the private pension system. 
3 In the case of general government, this was calculated on the basis of our estimate of annual wage inflation; the thirteenth-month wage for 2004,
to be disbursed in January 2005, was added to 2004 wages. 
4 According to the Central Statistical Office (CSO) labour force survey. 
5 Weighted average of manufacturing and market services. 
6 Net household income is proxied by the sum of total wage bill plus financial transfers.
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On the whole, since the May issue of the Quarterly
Report on Inflation, yields on government securities
have risen, while the forint exchange rate has been
more stable. However, conflicting trends alternated
throughout the period. While May and June were char-
acterised by rising yields, yields declined slightly and
the exchange rate strengthened in July, especially in
the second half of the month. While the deteriorating
assessment of domestic economic trends led to a last-
ing increase in the premium on forint-denominated
investments, external factors only increased the risk
premium temporarily. Postponement of the scheduled
date of adopting the euro is also likely to have con-
tributed to the rise in long-term yields. A monetary pol-
icy maintaining the base rate and central bank commu-
nication pointing out equilibrium-related problems and
emphasising necessary caution both contributed to the
relative stability of the exchange rate, and helped to
put an end to the rise in long-term interest rates.
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In terms of global factors, the recent changes in US
money markets have been of key importance and have
had a considerable impact on developments in Hungary
as well. With the upturn in the US business cycle, expec-
tations of an official interest rate increase increased con-
siderably since April. Investors interpreted the stronger-
than-expected employment data published on 7 May as
a definite sign of economic recovery. At end-June, the
Fed raised interest rates by 25 basis points, citing solid
growth and favourable labour market developments.
Thus, the United States has embarked on the upward
phase of the interest rate cycle, as had been anticipated
for some time. This was also reflected by the 30-day Fed
funds futures contracts incorporating interest rate expec-
tations: investors priced in another 50 basis point raise for
maturity in October.
In its statement, the Fed pointed out that it would contin-
ue to tighten monetary policy at a measured pace in the
future, which helped dampen exaggerated expectations
of interest rate hikes. At the beginning of the period
under review, markets harboured serious concerns about
the prospects of a sudden, large-scale increase in interest
rates, in line with the rapidly improving economic activi-
ty. This could have had an unfavourable impact on
emerging markets, but the developments have taken
place in a steady and smooth manner so far. Accelerating
inflation in the US, however, may be a factor of risk as far
as future interest rates are concerned: the Fed pointed
out repeatedly that it stands ready to tighten monetary
policy faster if price stability is jeopardised.
In the euro area, in line with the developments in the
US, the expected date of an interest rate increase
moved closer slightly between May and June, with a
correction taking place in July. In addition to the events
in the US, this was also due to the ECB’s communica-
tions suggesting that inflationary pressure in the euro
area was temporary and that price stability was not
exposed to risks over the medium term. According to
market expectations, any policy tightening in the euro
area is likely to take place at end-2004, as previously
anticipated.
Movements in long-term US dollar yields reflected
expectations relating to the Fed’s prospective meas-
ures. Ten-year yields rose by nearly 100 basis points
between early April and mid-June and declined by 50
basis points by mid-July. Ten-year euro yields moved
broadly in the same direction as dollar yields,
although they were substantially less volatile.
Chart 1.1
Federal Reserve and ECB key rates
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Chart 1.2
Ten-year benchmark yields
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1. 1 FOREIGN INTEREST RATES AND INVESTORS’ PERCEPTION OF RISK
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1
Although highly volatile, global risk indicators remain
rather depressed. At end-April, risk indicators – proba-
bly influenced by growing expectations of an increase
in dollar interest rates – began to rise rapidly. Since mid-
May, however, the EMBI, an index of average emerging-
country sovereign risks, the Maggie index, a gauge of
interest rate premia of euro-denominated bonds, and
the VIX, an indicator of implied volatility of the US
S&P500 share index, have all declined. Although short-
term US dollar interest rates rose in July (led by contin-
uously favourable news about the economic recovery),
this did not have an impact on global risk appetite. By
historical standards, all three indices are at low levels,
and the rise in interest rates in developed countries may
lead to a loss of global risk appetite in the near future.
This, in turn, may result in a decline in demand for
emerging-country financial assets and a rise in interest
rate premia.
Since early May, investors’ perception of risk has
improved in a number of countries in the region, lead-
ing to significant strengthening of the Polish, Czech and
Slovakian currencies. In terms of regional factors, forma-
tion of the new Polish government was considered a
favourable development. Political uncertainties sub-
sided and investors’ perception of the country’s risks
improved significantly, which was also reflected by
Polish yields and the exchange rate of the zloty.
According to market commentaries, the zloty may have
contributed to the strengthening of the forint at the end
of July. In the Czech Republic, however, political uncer-
tainty grew following the resignation of the Prime
Minister in early July, although formation of a new gov-
ernment helped reduce the uncertainties. The Czech
developments, however, did not have a significant
impact on the Hungarian markets. The strengthening of
the Czech and Polish currencies was partly due to the
fact that the interest rate cycle entered an upward
phase in both countries.
In addition to global developments, country-specific fac-
tors also had an effect on investors’ perception of risks
related to forint-denominated assets. The market’s
assessment of domestic economic fundamentals deteri-
orated somewhat since the latest Report, probably due
to growing risks related to the sustainability of econom-
ic activity over the medium term. Although investors
attributed the exceptionally high current account deficit
in April to a one-off effect related to EU accession,
growing uncertainty about the sustainability of the cur-
rent account deficit over the medium term is reflected
by the fact, that since May, analysts’ consensus in the
Reuters poll indicates a steady rise in deficit expecta-
tions for both this year and next year. Following the con-
siderably worse-than-expected inflation data for May,
professional analysts’ inflation expectations also took a
turn for the worse. Nor did investors’ assessment of the
fiscal outlook improve in the period under review: they
still consider the fiscal path to be a significant uncertain-
ty factor. The international credit rating agency Fitch
announced that the fiscal path for this year and next
year remains a factor of key importance in assessing
Hungary’s sovereign debt.
At the same time, the slow decline in premia on euro-
denominated bonds, reflecting country risks, which
started in early 2004, has continued both in Hungary
and Poland. This may be due in part to external devel-
opments, as the Maggie index showing the interest rate
premia on high-risk euro-denominated bonds has also
been declining since May. Moreover, certain Polish and
Hungarian euro-denominated bonds have also been
traded in the London-based NewEuroMTS system since
last November, which may have resulted in a fall in liq-
uidity premia on these securities. In addition, the
favourable impact of accession to the EU cannot be
ruled out either. The size of the decline, however, was
only 5–10 basis points over the past three months, and
had no significant impact on forint-denominated gov-
ernment securities yields.
Chart 1.3
Global risk indicators
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The HUF/EUR exchange rate has remained broadly flat
since mid-April, apart from some volatility. The appreci-
ating trend between early February and early April,
which resulted in an 8 per cent appreciation of the
forint, has broken and since then the exchange rate has
been moving in a narrow band. The exchange rate fell
below HUF/EUR 255–256 only for brief periods follow-
ing the publication of the Hungarian current account
balance data in April, May and June, the release of infla-
tion data in June and growing concerns related to the
earlier-than-expected upturn in US interest rates.
Since April, the Polish zloty and the Czech crown have
been appreciating considerably, due primarily to coun-
try-specific reasons.1 Simultaneously with the apprecia-
tion of the Polish currency against the euro, the forint
also strengthened, perhaps in line with the trend in US
dollar exchange rates.
Information on changes in exchange rate expectations
can be gained from Reuters’ regular monthly surveys,
from analyses of investment banks operating in the
forint market and from the prices of derivative products.
According to the Reuters survey, expectations for end-
2005 appear to have changed little between January
and July. This means that analysts’ average expectation
of an exchange rate around HUF/EUR 255 has not
reacted to movements in the spot exchange rate.
Average expectations for end-2004 rose between
January and April, possibly as a result of the apprecia-
tion of the spot exchange rate. Since early 2004, when
the delay in introducing the euro was first announced
by the Government (original plans had planned for
1. 2 EXCHANGE RATES
1 See Section 1.1.
Chart 1.4
Exchange rate of the forint
245
250
255
260
265
270
275
Ju
ne
 0
3
Ju
ly
 0
3
A
ug
. 0
3
S
ep
. 0
3
O
ct
. 0
3
N
ov
. 0
3
D
ec
. 0
3
Ja
n.
 0
4
F
eb
. 0
4
M
ar
. 0
4
A
pr
. 0
4
M
ay
 0
4
Ju
ne
 0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
HUF/EUR
245
250
255
260
265
270
275
HUF/EUR
 
Chart 1.5
Exchange rates of the currencies of certain new
EU countries vis-à-vis the euro 
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Chart 1.6
Reuters analysts’ exchange rate expectations for
end-2004 and end-2005 and the forint’s ERM II
central parity
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introduction of the euro in 2008), the guiding power of
the anticipated central parity in the ERM II exchange
rate system on exchange rate expectations has weak-
ened. The Reuters survey also reveals that the anticipat-
ed date of entry into ERM II has been postponed. While
previously macro analysts predicted entry to take place
in the near future (in 2005), in July they expected
Hungary to join the European exchange rate mecha-
nism sometime between 2006 and 2008.
Based on exchange rate movements in recent months
and the Reuters consensus, we found that analysts
expect a practically flat or a slightly depreciating
exchange rate path in the 18 months ahead. Some analy-
ses by foreign investment banks, however, still contain a
pessimistic scenario of a significant depreciation of the
forint. In general, the possibility of exchange rate weaken-
ing is usually related to persistent, serious concerns about
Hungary’s external balance.
Data on the options market presents an ambiguous pic-
ture of the uncertainty in the market’s exchange rate
expectations. One-month HUF/EUR implied volatility
has been on the decline since mid-May (in line with the
EMBI index reflecting emerging market risks), and
remained below the early-May level even at the begin-
ning of August. However, one-year volatility only em-
barked on a definite downward trend in the second half
of July, and then rebounded in early August to the level
recorded at the beginning of May. In terms of the uncer-
tainty of market rate expectations, these developments
suggest that the likelihood of a significant devaluation in
the very short term declined continuously, but only
decreased later with regard to the longer, one-year hori-
zon. Currently, uncertainty is still roughly at the level
recorded three months ago.
The fact that exchange rate appreciation has stopped is
closely related to developments in the forint positions
taken by foreign participants in the market. In February
and March, significant long forint positions were opened
and investors closed short forint positions. By contrast,
since April a stagnating tendency has been seen.
Since April, foreign investors’ holdings of forint-denomi-
nated government securities have not changed substan-
tially, and thus the increase seen since the beginning of
the year has come to an end. As evidence of the uncer-
tainty surrounding long-term developments, although
the decline in the average maturity of these securities
since mid-2003 has apparently stopped, foreign
investors’ interest in longer-term government securities
is still moderate.
Chart 1.7
Shifts in the forint exchange rate and Reuters
analysts’ exchange rate expectations
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Chart 1.9
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In the market of Hungarian government securities, the
decline in yields which characterised the previous quar-
ter came to an end in early May, with yields subse-
quently rising significantly over nearly every maturity up
to mid-June. Although yields fell between mid-June and
early August, they still considerably exceed early-May
yields (by 40–80 basis points).
Foreign investors’ risk perception and appetite were
probably major factors affecting yields. In May, the
underlying reason for the increase in yields was the
uncertainty regarding the interest rate cycle in the USA,
whereas in June the predominant motives were con-
cerns about Hungarian inflation, the country’s econom-
ic equilibrium and the pace of convergence. Since mid-
June yields have fallen, presumably as a result of
improving global and regional risk perception, whereby
the declining short-term uncertainty related to forint
exchange rates may also have had an influence.
Following earlier interest rate cuts, the Monetary
Council of the MNB maintained the key policy rate at
11.5 per cent throughout the period, arguing in favour
of a cautious interest rate policy in its releases in light of
the deteriorating inflationary outlook and risk percep-
tion.2 As a result of worsening risk assessment and the
corresponding reactions of the central bank, expecta-
tions of the base rate for the next two years rose in May
and June, as revealed in the responses given by market
analysts surveyed by Reuters, and the implied forward
yield curve. Simultaneously, longer-term forward yields
stopped rising and soon a clear decline was recorded at
longer maturities more accurately reflecting the long-
term risk assessment. An improvement in risk assess-
ment at the end of July resulted in a slight decline in the
expected 2004-2005 interest rate, which, however, still
exceeds early-May expectations by 60–100 basis
points.
1. 3 YIELDS
Chart 1.10
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Chart 1.11
Implied one-year forward rates for different dates
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Chart 1.12
Expected path of the central bank base rate
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2 Furthermore, the Monetary Council decided that, as of 5 July, as much as reasonably possible, its second monthly meeting would be a rate-setting
meeting. The Current topics section offers an overview of the international practice of scheduling rate-setting.
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HUF/EUR forward differentials, which reflect risk assess-
ment trends more directly than forint forwards, followed
a similar trend. In other words, instead of euro yields,
forint yields were predominantly affected by the expect-
ed risk premium and, at shorter maturities, perhaps by
exchange rate expectations.
Long-term yields may have been influenced by the fact
that market participants have postponed the expected
date of Hungary’s adoption of the euro. Regional
Reuters surveys confirm that in line with the
Government’s announcements, market participants’
expectations of the adoption date gradually shifted, and
on the basis of the May and August 2004 surveys the
majority of market analysts considered 2010 as the
most likely date of euro adoption.
The rise in forward differentials on horizons relevant
from the point of view of the euro adoption also sup-
ports the idea that market participants have postponed
the expected date of Hungary’s entry into the euro
area. The continued uncertainty regarding convergence
is reflected in the persistently high level of long-term for-
ward differentials, and in the fact that at horizons of 6–7
years they significantly exceed the current country risk
premium (10–20 basis points), which could be expect-
ed if the market participants were certain of the 2010
euro adoption date.
Chart 1.13
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Chart 1.14
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Monetary policy affects the real economy primarily
through real exchange rates and real interest rates.
Given the dominance of foreign trade in Hungary, the
forint exchange rate channel plays a more important
role. Below, we briefly outline the recent changes and
future developments in these two variables as anticipat-
ed by market participants. This description of market
expectations relies on macroeconomic analyses in the
Reuters survey, which, although it is not a perfect repre-
sentative sample of all economic participants, provides
a good picture of general trends.
Following nominal appreciation in the period
February–March, the effective real exchange rate calcu-
lated on the basis of the consumer price index (one of
the most widely used measures of external competitive-
ness) strengthened only moderately up until May. The
0.5 per cent appreciation was caused by excess inflation
in Hungary. During the period, the nominal effective
exchange rate remained practically unchanged.
Based on macro analysts’ exchange rate and inflation
expectations, we calculated the real exchange rate path
they anticipate up to end-2005.3 Similarly to the past
three months, the 1.4 per cent real appreciation expect-
ed for the rest of this year and the further 2.4 per cent
real appreciation expected for 2005 are wholly attribut-
able to Hungarian excess inflation, as the nominal
exchange rate is not anticipated to appreciate. The
extent of the expected strengthening of the real
exchange rate is broadly in line with the pace of equilib-
rium appreciation for the Hungarian economy.
The rise in nominal yields, discussed in the previous sec-
tion, was also reflected in various real interest rate indi-
cators.4 Nevertheless, the increase in the forward-look-
ing real interest rate can to a greater extent be attrib-
uted to subsiding inflation expectations.5 The indicator
increased by 1 per cent from April to June; and its cur-
rent 6 per cent value is considered high even by histor-
ical standards. The contemporaneous real interest rate6
1. 4 MONETARY CONDITIONS
3 The following simplifications were used: 1) the effective exchange rate time series was lengthened by the anticipated changes in the HUF/EUR exchange
rate, 2) we assumed that the annual (weighted) inflation of the trading partners would be similar to that registered in the last two years (2.4 per cent).
4 We used monthly average yields on one-year treasury bill, deflated with the contemporaneous 12-month inflation and Reuters one-year forward-look-
ing inflation consensus (value computed by interpolation from year-end and year-average inflation expectations.) The expectation relevant to January
2005 is calculated from Reuters’ one-year yield and inflation consensus.
5 As the inflation expectations for the next twelve months are values calculated from the Reuters survey and as next year’s (twelve-month) inflation is
largely influenced by technical factors (base effect), and we only have limited information on expectations, the error in the estimated forward-looking real
interest rate may be greater than usual.
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declined during the same period, due to the rising
twelve-month inflation figure.
In mid-July, macro analysts anticipated a two-percent-
age-point decline in one-year government securities
yields by end-2004. According to this, in January 2005
the forward-looking real interest rate may fall by more
than 100 basis points, to below 5 per cent.
Therefore, the rise in the risk premium was reflected in
monetary conditions similarly as in nominal variables.
Accordingly, the rise in the real interest rate can be con-
sidered the most important development, and it
remained consistently high in 2004 H1, even measured
by historical standards. Analysts’ expectations suggest a
significant drop in real interest rates and a slight appreci-
ation of the real exchange rate in the future.
6 The box entitled Different methods for calculating the real rate of interest in the December 2000 issue of the Report provides a detailed description of
the characteristics and information content of various real interest rate measures.
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After beginning to accelerate at end-2003, domestic
real economic trends further strengthened in 2004 Q1.
As reflected in output indicators suggesting a high
growth rate, domestic enterprises responded with the
usual intensity to the pick-up in external demand. On
the demand side, vigorous fixed investment activity and
powerful export growth outweighed the expected slow-
down in household consumption, leading to a faster-
than-expected increase in GDP.
2. 1. 1 EXTERNAL DEMAND
The upturn in external economic activity from 2003 H2,
especially in Europe as Hungary’s most important
export market, maintained its momentum in 2004 Q1.
Industrial output data, which were rather volatile after
the global recession came to an end in early 2002, have
been reflecting steadily faster growth since January
2004. In Hungary’s most important trading partners,
GDP grew rapidly in 2004 Q1 (at an annualised quar-
terly growth rate of over 2 per cent).7 Such a high
growth rate has not been recorded since 2000 Q4.
Growth was fuelled primarily by net exports based on a
robust recovery in the USA and the East Asian region,
while domestic demand only picked up slowly.
Although there was a brief upswing in fixed investment
in 2003 Q4 in Hungary’s trading partners, this growth
slowed in 2004 Q1, and an expansion in household
consumption still failed to occur.
Thus, Hungary’s export markets grew vigorously, with a
particularly significant increase in imports in Germany,
Hungary’s most important trading partner. Stock build-
ing continues to be one of the underlying reasons for
high imports, indicating an anticipation of a pick-up in
domestic demand.
Due to the strong appreciation (against the US dollar, in
particular), the euro somewhat neutralised skyrocketing
oil prices, but in recent months the US dollar has
regained its strength to a certain extent. Although the
strong euro may mar euro area net export over the long
term, up till now there has been little indication of such
a trend. Oil prices, however, continued to rise in 2004
Q2. While this will not reverse the upturn in external
demand, it may arrest its speed.
2.1 BUSINESS CYCLE DEVELOPMENTS
7 In our Reports, monthly and quarterly growth rates are always calculated based on time series adjusted for calendar effects and seasonality. To facili-
tate comparison with annual growth rates (i.e. change compared to the same period of the previous year), monthly and quarterly growth rates are
expressed in annualised form (i.e. in the case of quarterly growth rates figures are raised to the fourth, in the case of monthly growth rates figures are
raised to the twelfth power). See Manual on Hungarian Economic Statistics, 2002, MNB, www.mnb.hu.
Size of Hungary’s export markets (import-based
external demand) and GDP growth in major markets
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Despite all of this, business sentiment is improving in
most countries in the euro area. Although the IFO
Institute’s index of German corporate executives’
expectations has fallen slightly since early 2004, it is still
well above the values typical of recessions.
Thus, the Hungarian economy, and especially the
export-oriented business sector, has been receiving
clearly positive impetus from external demand.
2. 1. 2 OUTPUT
Primarily driven by improving external demand, domes-
tic output continued to strengthen. Actually, by as early
as the beginning of 2002 the Hungarian manufacturing
sector had already recovered from the recession caused
by the global downturn, and after initially slow growth
in gross output, from early 2003 it embarked on a path
of decidedly rapid expansion.
As manufacturing value added rose somewhat slower, a
relatively significant gap developed between the two
output indicators (in 2003 the gross manufacturing out-
put increased by 7 per cent, whereas value added rose
by a mere 3.5 per cent). Data for 2003 Q4, and even
more so for 2004 Q1, indicate that this gap is closing,
as gross output growth slowed while value added
increased faster than expected. The latter primarily
reflected the performance of export-oriented manufac-
turing branches (machinery and equipment, and certain
branches of the chemical industry), which is also evi-
denced in sales data: stagnation, or rather a decline in
domestic sales (based on 2004 Q2 data) was accompa-
nied by vigorous, although recently decelerating export
sales.
Manufacturing output growth is founded on a relatively
firm basis: improvement in productivity. A more
detailed analysis of productivity (see Section 4.5)
reveals that although productivity growth does not
exceed the rate ‘usual’ for a cyclical upturn, structural
effects (such as sectoral shifts and the (partially connect-
ed) increase in capital intensity) can be observed which
may extend the period of strong productivity growth.
Surveys of domestic business activity in 2004 Q2, how-
ever, provide contradictory information: although senti-
ment is improving, future sales possibilities and invest-
ment intentions were not always assessed favourably by
private sector managers.
Up to end-2003 value added generated in market ser-
vices appeared to be growing at a measured pace, but
then in 2004 Q1 it suddenly shot up (to nearly 5 per
cent on an annualised quarterly basis as compared to 3
per cent in 2003 Q4). One fact likely to have con-
tributed to this development was that the service sec-
tors which are more strongly dependent on the external
business cycle (e.g. transport and communications serv-
ices) performed better than expected, and thus the
impact of the slowdown in household consumption (pri-
marily via commercial services) on service sector output
was less severe.
2. 1. 3 HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS
AND FIXED INVESTMENT
As expected, 2004 Q1 saw considerably slower growth
in household consumption than last year’s average
(household consumption expenditures increased at an
annual rate of 3.8 per cent, while the annualised quar-
terly rate was 3.4 per cent), although this is due partly
to one-off effects. Most importantly, postponement of
consumption due to a change in the registration tax for
newly purchased motor vehicles should be mentioned
here. This postponement also appears to be confirmed
by the retail trade turnover recorded in the two-month
period around Hungary’s accession to the EU (April and
May 2004), which indicated massive growth in motor
vehicle purchases. This means that deferred motor vehi-
cle purchases certainly played a major role in the low
growth rate of 2004 Q1 consumption.
Simultaneously, an adjustment began in household sav-
ings, which hit an historical low in 2003: instead of
spending most of their additional income generated as
a result of the faster-than-expected rise in real wages,
households began to increase their savings. Based on
data available from commercial banks’ reports, this
trend continued in 2004 Q2. Nevertheless, increased
disposable income earned in the form of higher wages
can still provide an impetus for household consumption
expenditure despite a growing savings rate. However,
the earlier propensity to consume, which – as a result of
a massive expansion in household consumption in the
previous two years – was extremely high even by inter-
national standards, has clearly started to drop, and this
trend may continue.
Value added
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As a result of new loan agreements concluded at end-
2003, household fixed investment was still strong in
2004 Q1, but new borrowing tapered off considerably.
Second-quarter data for retail trade turnover and the
number of housing permits issued still reflect a boom in
household fixed investment activity, which means that
on the whole the slowdown in household consumption
and fixed investment is not proceeding as rapidly as was
earlier expected.
2. 1. 4 CORPORATE FIXED INVESTMENT AND STOCKS
To a great degree, corporate fixed investment activity was
shaped by the external business cycle during the period
under review. In the previous Report, we indicated that
corporate fixed investment, and in particular manufactur-
ing fixed investment, was especially sensitive to changes
in external demand. Accordingly, as the expansion in
external demand started to gather pace from 2003 H2,
corporate sector growth soared and reached at rates that
were last seen during the 1997-1998 period of foreign
company relocation and expansion.
According to the most recent business surveys, growth
in capacity utilisation seems to have slowed, evidently
because a growing number of companies consider their
current capacities sufficient to meet future orders. In the
light of this, the fact that corporate fixed investment
continued to grow at a very high rate in 2004 Q1 may
be deemed unexpected. The underlying reason was
that although manufacturing fixed investment actually
slowed (in line with expectations), market service
providers increased their fixed investment activity at a
rate that was surprising after the stagnation that had
characterised the whole of 2003 (chiefly in the field of
transport/telecommunication and real estate and gener-
al business activities).
In earlier issues we indicated that one source of strong
manufacturing investment activity was probably not yet
activated fixed investment recorded among inventories.
The 2004 Q1 pause in the decline in manufacturing
stocks was in line with the sector’s trend in fixed invest-
ment. By contrast, commercial stocks increased signifi-
cantly in 2004 Q1, which may reflect lower household
consumption.
2. 1. 5 FOREIGN TRADE AND MARKET SHARE
Developments in foreign trade were largely dictated by
strong foreign demand, and in conjunction with this, EU
accession in May 2004 also had an effect on export and
import figures. Firstly, customs borders changes (a result
of accession) led to increased purchases from non-EU
countries facing higher duties in the future. Secondly,
the uncertainty arising from the transformation of cus-
toms offices also induced some companies (predomi-
nantly in the wholesale trade sector) to stock up their
inventories by increased purchases abroad. These
motives mainly affected import figures.
However, with accession the statistical reporting system
was also changed, resulting in greater uncertainty with
respect to preliminary data. Thus, from now on signifi-
cantly higher revisions of foreign trade data are expect-
Household consumption expenditure
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
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ed, rendering short-term analysis and even medium-
term forecasting of these processes more problematic.
Monthly trade data indicates a deceleration in exports of
goods in the first half of 2004, but growth compared to
2003 H1 is still strong. Part of this deceleration can be
attributed to the slowdown in manufacturing export sales,
but obviously, methodological changes in connection with
EU accession also played a role. When it published the pre-
liminary June data for foreign trade, the Central Statistical
Office already revised down the May export data by a size-
able amount. As a result, data show much less expansion
in goods export. Moreover, making use of estimated price
indices, the volume of goods export actually stagnated
rather than increased in 2004 Q2.
Imports of goods were particularly strong up to April
2004, probably attributable to a sizeable amount of pur-
chases drawn forward. Due to their very nature, these
effects will not leave import data unaffected for the rest
of 2004, as much of the intended purchases have
already been carried out. Thus, imports of goods may
be lower in the remainder of the year compared to
what would be expected based on the cyclical situation.
May and June data for goods imports may already mir-
ror this development.
Foreign trade data in the national accounts (also incor-
porating trade in services) exhibited strong growth in
2004 Q1 driven by solid external demand. Import
growth outstripped export growth in terms of quarterly
rates (annualised quarterly growth was 24 per cent for
imports and 14 per cent for exports), but annual growth
rates still indicate an improvement in net exports. Data
from the second quarter, however, imply a worsening in
net exports.
On the whole, as imports increased far more quickly
than expected, the current account balance of trade in
goods was much less favourable than forecast in the
May 2004 issue of the Report. For this reason the cur-
rent account deficit is also higher than expected; more-
over, we forecast a significantly higher current account
deficit (see Section 4.4) for the whole year.
Based on exports growth, which began to pick up pace
in the second half of 2003, Hungary slightly increased
its share in the markets of the EU-15, and as a result of
further strengthening in 2004 Q1, contributed 2.8 per
cent to total (non-EU) imports to the European Union.
2. 1. 6 ECONOMIC GROWTH
Exports and imports of goods in customs statistics
At current prices
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Currently, the domestic business cycle is determined by
a strong upturn in the corporate sector fuelled by a
rapid increase in external demand, on the one hand,
and a slowdown in household consumption, on the
other. Meanwhile, despite the opposing short-term
trends, annual net export indices are improving. The
strong GDP growth of 4.2 per cent in 2004 Q1 result-
ed from the above factors.
Our analyses suggest, however, that other technical fac-
tors such as the so-called calendar effect, which is inde-
pendent of underlying cyclical developments, have also
contributed to this high growth rate. Accordingly,
although it appears clear that economic growth is accel-
erating based on output and demand data, the actual
rate of growth was presumably slightly slower than the
figure derived from the original data.8
Table 2.1
8 Note that, if our estimates for the significance of the calendar effects are correct, the 2005 Q1 GDP data would be distorted downwards to the extent of
these effects in 2004 Q1. See Section 4.6 for more details.
2001 2002 2003 2004
Q1 *
Household consumption 5.9 9.3 6.5 3.0
Household final cons. expenditure 5.7 10.3 7.6 3.8
Social transfers in kind 6.5 4.9 1.8 -0.8
Public consumption 5.3 4.8 1.9 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 5.0 8.0 3.0 18.9
‘Final domestic sales’** 5.6 8.5 5.2 5.3
Domestic absorption 1.9 5.4 5.5 4.3
Exports 7.8 3.7 7.2 17.4
Imports 5.1 6.2 10.3 16.6
GDP 3.8 3.5 2.9 4.2
GDP growth and its constituents
Percentage changes on a year earlier
* Data are not adjusted for seasonal effects, CSO.
** Final domestic sales =household consumption + public consumption + gross fixed capital formation.
GDP growth
Adjusted for seasonal and calendar effects, annualised quarter-
on-quarter growth rates
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2. 2. 1 LABOUR INPUT
The lively recovery seen in Hungary’s export markets
since early 2003 has resulted in stronger use of and
demand for production factors. In addition to boosting
investment activity, labour demand has also increased,
although the various branches of the economy exhibit
different patterns in this regard.
Businesses tend to adjust to changes in the business
cycle mainly by altering the intensity of the factor which
is least costly for them, namely labour utilisation, i.e. by
adjusting the average number of the hours worked.
Consequently, the steady improvement in manufactur-
ing since 2003 Q1 is mirrored in the data on average
hours worked.
Despite the constant rise in labour intensity over the last
12 months, there are no indications that the decline in
manufacturing employment seen since 2000 has come
to a halt. An analysis of the data for the past few years
reveals the striking fact that employment-which usually
follows a rise in the average number of hours worked
with a delay of two to three quarters-is far behind sched-
ule in the current business cycle. The reasons for this
include long-term restructuring of corporate produc-
tion, intra-industry realignment and scarcity of labour
supply in certain manufacturing professions.
Over recent years, the price of labour has risen consid-
erably. A large number of companies reacted to the
sudden rise in labour costs by substituting labour with
capital. During periods of economic upturn, this substi-
tution of labour accelerates, generating increasing
demand for capital and lower employment.
Re-structuring within manufacturing is related to the
phenomenon mentioned above. As pointed out in sev-
eral earlier issues, companies in the textiles industry
have been the main victims of the rapid growth in
labour costs in recent years. Highly labour-intensive
businesses were hardly able to compete with their com-
petitors operating abroad which employ significantly
cheaper labour, and thus these companies were fre-
quently compelled to cut back production or close
down factories. Data on recent months reveal that the
decline in the number of people employed in the textile
industry has been slowing, but this industry remains the
primary factor behind the drop in manufacturing
employment.
Further factors impeding an increase in employment
include the scarce labour supply in some professions.
According to anecdotal information, rising demand is
more and more frequently confronted with difficulties
due to the lack of skilled labourers in a number of fields,
while there is oversupply in others, primarily in non-
manual professions requiring higher qualifications.9 The
resulting structural labour shortage prevents a major
increase in employment.
In the field of market services, labour demand contin-
ues to grow rapidly as evidenced by brisk employment
growth and the sharp increase in hours worked. The
trend over the last few months suggests that the slow
decline in consumption has not yet affected compa-
nies’ employment policy decisions. Employment data
for 2004 Q1 suggest especially robust labour demand
due primarily to the jump in employment in the sectors
‘trade and repairs’ and ‘real estates and business serv-
ices’ recorded in early 2004. The other branches of the
extremely heterogeneous service sector have seen no
change in 2004 in terms of employment growth rates.
Over the medium term, the slowdown in consumption
will presumably have an impact on labour demand in
sectors which are more strongly dependent on con-
sumption, while manufacturing and sectors linked
more closely to external markets are likely to further
increase their workforce. However, for the time being
the available data do not reveal any such shift.
2.2.2 LABOUR MARKET RESERVES AND TIGHTNESS
2.2 LABOUR MARKET
9 In addition to anecdotal evidence the 2004 Q1 labour survey of the Employment Office also indicates labour market tightness. According to the data
the share of companies complaining about skill mismatch has doubled in the course of one year.
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Latest data reveal that steady, modest decline in unem-
ployment, which represents the most important labour
reserve for the economy, in 2003 was interrupted in
early 2004. Although it is too early to conclude that the
growth in unemployment seen in the second quarter
was a turning point, this year’s increase in the number
of unemployed and the rate relative to the economical-
ly active population is in line with our earlier expecta-
tions.
Government sector and manufacturing lay-offs may
help alleviate labour market tightness, albeit the rapidly
growing service sector will only be able to absorb the
labour released from these two sectors with a certain
delay. This rise in unemployment stemming from inter-
industry labour shifts is supported by international expe-
rience. The main reason is the difference between the
skills of workers dismissed from sectors which are
shrinking and the qualifications required in sectors
which are expanding.
The acceleration of labour market reallocation is sub-
stantiated by the number of vacancies registered by
the National Employment Office of Hungary and
reported mass redundancies. The simultaneous cre-
ation and loss of jobs is related on the one hand to
long-term realignment in the private sector and on the
other hand to the scarce labour supply in certain
branches.
In view of these facts, the question arises as to why
there are no signs of this effect in the 2003 data. The
decline in manufacturing workforce and growth in that
of the service sector were strong in 2003, and labour
migration was quite smooth based on the unemploy-
ment data from the CSO’s labour force survey (LFS),
which uses ILO methodology. The statistics on the num-
ber of unemployed registered by the National
Employment Office slightly contradict this picture.
Although registered unemployment obviously does not
correspond to actual labour supply, the number of reg-
istered unemployed moved in line with the number of
people in search of jobs as per the LFS up to early 2003.
Since then, however, the two statistics have diverged:
the former pointed to a continuous rise in labour sup-
ply, while the latter indicated a declining labour supply
in 2003.
Although unemployment has started to increase, it
remains low, which is a clear sign of a tight labour mar-
ket. For a long time only the service sector suffered
from scarce labour supply, as staff numbers increased
rapidly in this sector. However, in the past few quarters,
there have been indications of bottlenecks also in cer-
tain manufacturing trades, primarily in respect of skilled
labourers. The skill mismatch in manufacturing hampers
any increase in the sector’s workforce and pushes wage
inflation up.
Total hours worked*
Manufacturing and market services; million hours per quarter
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2. 2. 3 WAGE INFLATION
Most recent data reveal that wage inflation has been
rapidly increasing in the private sector since early 2003.
The data available in May 2004 did not indicate this
increase in average earnings, but in light of the new
data, seasonally adjusted private sector wage inflation
had to be revised up considerably.10 In the first few
months of 2004, the rate of wage increase did not slow.
This trend affects manufacturing and the service sector
alike, but the underlying reasons are different for the
two sectors.
By early 2003, manufacturing had passed its cyclical
low point. Due to burgeoning external demand, manu-
facturing companies recorded rapidly rising value
added. As indicated in the previous section, the brisk
increase in labour costs characteristic of the past few
years increasingly forced businesses to substitute labour
with capital. The loss of low productivity jobs and sub-
stitution with capital drives up the sector’s productivity
and wage inflation. With the increase in output, labour
can be increasingly substituted by capital. Thus, the
above-described trends accelerated during the manu-
facturing boom.
The decline in the textile industry can also be consid-
ered as an aggregated substitution of labour with capi-
tal. With the loss of jobs at highly labour-intensive com-
panies, manufacturing output has shifted towards more
capital-intensive branches, as reflected in the indicators
of both aggregate productivity and aggregate average
earnings.
Another reason for the constant rise in manufacturing
wage inflation is bottlenecks in labour supply that have
developed over the past few months. Despite
favourable cyclical trends and rising output, there are
no indications of staff adjustments by manufacturing
businesses. In addition to more capital-intensive produc-
tion, this is explained by the skill mismatch in the labour
market. As a result of increasing demand for specialised
skills and limited labour supply in certain trades, enter-
prises were compelled to yield to pressure for higher
wages.
As a result of these factors, wage inflation started to
accelerate as early as 2003 Q1. By end-2003, the
steady decrease in employment and a rapid rise in value
added resulted in outstanding productivity growth. As a
result, despite an acceleration in labour costs, real unit
labour costs (ULC) have fallen over the past 12 months.
Within the framework of market services, both the
corporate recovery and strong domestic demand con-
tributed to a rapid rise in value added in the sector.
Despite this fact, high labour demand in the sector
has stunted productivity growth. Moreover, as a result
of a strong increase in employment in this sector,
which even exceeded the growth rate of value added,
stagnation turned into a decline in productivity.
Increased labour demand was presumably confronted
with repeated difficulties because of the shortage in
labour supply, and thus employers were forced to
raise wages. Corporate service providers capitalised
on vigorous consumer demand and the domestic
recovery, and offset rising labour costs by increasing
prices. Nevertheless, early in 2004 the rise in specific
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labour costs left service price inflation far behind,
exposing companies in the sector to declining profit
on labour. However, the early-2004 trends probably
reflect a delayed adjustment of firms and are merely
temporary, especially with a view to the fact that the
outstanding rise in employment registered in early
2004 was confined to a few branches within the sec-
tor.
Wage inflation in the private sector
Annualised quarter-on-quarter indices
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In 2004 Q2, CPI and core inflation stood at 7.3 and 6.2
per cent, respectively, representing growth of 0.5 per
cent in the CPI and a 0.2 per cent increase in core infla-
tion relative to Q1. Thus, in the first half of 2004 funda-
mental indicators of inflation reached the levels record-
ed two years earlier.
This rise in inflation compared to the previous year is
mainly explained by the increases in indirect taxes in
early 2004. It is noteworthy, however, that the indicator
adjusted for the primary direct effects of tax rises, the
so-called ‘constant tax-based consumer price index‘
(CTI11) has also increased over the past six months. Core
inflation estimated with constant taxes certainly cap-
tures the essence of long-term inflation-related develop-
ments even more fully. In our estimation, this indicator
rose by a significant 0.6 percentage points in 2004 Q1,
and then fell slightly (by 0.3 percentage points) in Q2.
It should be noted, however, that analysis of net infla-
tion indicators requires great care. As explained on sev-
eral occasions, this is because as an effect of indirect tax
rises, net prices may drop, as depending on the supply
and demand situation, producers are unlikely to pass
increased tax burdens on to consumers in the short run,
and they do not necessarily in the long run. This also
means that net inflation indicators may not be consid-
ered as ‘underlying’ inflation indicators in the tradition-
al sense of the word, as they do not indicate the level of
inflation in the absence of indirect tax rises. In other
words, these indices are adjusted exclusively for the
direct effects of tax rises, but not for the secondary
effects.
On the whole, the underlying reason for the CPI rise
seen in the past six months was indirect tax rises, but
that demand and supply trends also contributed to the
increase in inflation. More specifically, the price index
was raised by products and services covered by core
2.3 INFLATION
2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2
Core inflation 4.8 6.0 6.2
Unprocessed foodstuffs 5.7 4.9 8.0
Motor fuels and market 
priced energy
Regulated prices 7.8 11.7 10.1
Total CPI 5.4 6.8 7.3
Table 2.2
CPI and its major components
Annual percentage changes
CPI and core inflation
Annual percentage changes
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inflation in Q1, and by items exogenous to monetary
policy (unprocessed foods and motor fuels) in Q2.
Over the last twelve months, each Report pointed out
our expectation that inflation would reach a turning
point in mid-2004, as economic developments would
no longer exert inflationary pressure.12 In our opinion,
this is confirmed by data from the end of 2004 H1.
On the basis of the above estimates it can be estab-
lished that although the demand-supply trends exerted
upward pressure on inflation in 2004 H1, indicators
reflecting long-term trends suggest no increase in this
inflationary pressure in 2004 Q2.
Among the factors pushing up inflation in 2004 H1,
soaring private sector wages and unit labour costs, the
end-2003 and early-2004 energy price rises and the
introduction of eco-taxes need to be highlighted on the
supply side. Meanwhile, the currently stronger HUF
exchange rate may have offset the delayed inflationary
effects of last year’s weak exchange rate, and in some
sectors it may have even strengthened disinflation.
The demand side cannot be clearly assessed. While at
the beginning of the first half of the year, the delayed
inflationary effect of the rapid consumption growth
between 2001 and mid-2003 may have been predomi-
nant, in the second half of the period reviewed this may
well have been offset by the decline seen in consump-
tion growth in the past twelve months. These macro-
economic trends affected the various sectors of the
economy in different ways.
Annualised quarter-on-quarter inflation data for tradable
goods suggest stagnation in a band between 2.0-2.5 per
cent since 2003 Q3. At the same time, another drop in
durable prices was recorded in 2004 Q2, a phenome-
non which was last seen twelve months ago. The
stronger forint exchange rate probably played the most
important role in this development.
The significance of disinflation in the prices of such
goods is enhanced by the fact that the price index for
new and used cars (which is also included in this group)
rose in 2004 Q2, presumably partly because of the
introduction of the registration tax, which replaced the
consumption tax and resulted altogether in a higher tax
burden (especially for used cars). However, in compari-
son to durables, the price index for non-durables (which
characteristically includes value added from several
services) did not decrease in 2004 H1. This means that
the effects of the strong forint exchange rate may have
been offset by trends causing domestic inflationary
pressure, and wage inflation may have played a pivotal
role in this respect.
Indirect tax changes
Included Not included (CTI)
2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 
CPI 5.4 6.8 7.3 4.9* 5.0 5.1
Core inflation 4.8 6.0 6.2 4.3* 4.9* 4.6*
Table 2.3
Inflation indicators
Annual percentage changes
Developments in headline (CPI) and constant tax
(CTI) inflation*
Annual percentage changes
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12 See: Quarterly Report on Inflation, August 2003, p. 19; Quarterly Report on Inflation, November 2003, p. 20; Quarterly Report on Inflation, February
2004, pp. 32–33; Quarterly Report on Inflation, May 2004, pp. 40–41.
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Inflation in market services developed differently in the
two quarters of 2004 H1: after initially increasing in Q1,
it then decreased in Q2. The Q1 increase was caused
primarily by VAT rises, but other supply shocks includ-
ing energy price rises (at the end of 2003 and the begin-
ning of 2004) and the introduction of the energy tax
may also have contributed to this development.13
Inflation in processed foods shot up in 2004 Q1, basical-
ly as a result of the VAT increase at the beginning of the
year. If the time series is adjusted for the direct effect of
this tax rise, from the seasonally adjusted quarterly data
it can be concluded that inflation in processed foods has
held stable at roughly around 5 per cent over the past
twelve months. Nevertheless, inflation definitely gath-
ered pace during the past two quarters, mainly as a
result of massive rises in the price of sugar. The reason
for this was the introduction of a guaranteed minimum
wholesale purchase price after Hungary’s accession to
the EU. Increased competition resulting from the EU
membership pushed prices down in a number of food
products (primarily milk and dairy products), although
the extent of cuts remained insignificant.14
Rises in excise duties in early 2004 boosted alcohol
and tobacco prices considerably. Nevertheless, pro-
ducers in these two sectors reacted to tax rises differ-
ently: alcohol producers passed on the entire increase,
while tobacco producers passed only part of the bur-
dens on to consumers. According to our calculations,
the tax rises on alcohol products raised the overall CPI
by 0.2 percentage points in 2004 H1. Resulting from a
10 per cent cut in the net (producer) prices of tobacco
products and a roughly 30 per cent rise in unit excise
duties, prices rose by approximately 17 per cent
according to our calculations, but only two-thirds of
this increase appeared in the statistics.15
As indicated earlier, over the past six months other
items contributed significantly to the CPI rise, but indi-
rect tax rises also played a key role. Disregarding addi-
tional price rises caused by tax changes, it can be stat-
ed that exogenous items had an essentially neutral
effect in 2004 Q1, but a clearly inflationary effect in
2004 Q2.
After the shock-like price rise seen at the end of 2003,
unprocessed food prices rose only slightly in 2004 Q1,
failing to even keep pace with VAT rises. Subsequently,
during May and June, prices rises regained impetus. If
the constituents of end-2003 and 2004 Q2 price rises
are compared, a significant difference is found. While
the 2003 price rises basically affected a single range of
goods, namely domestic and imported fruit, the 2004
increase was found for several products, although
increases in pork prices, in line with a similar trend in
the EU, are undoubtedly the leading factor.
In the past quarter, motor fuel prices contributed con-
siderably to the increase in inflation. The underlying rea-
son is the rise of international crude oil prices: while at
end-2003 a barrel of oil cost EUR 25, the June 2004
average price approached EUR 30. In addition, rises in
Inflation in tradables prices
Seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter 
growth rates
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13 At this point let us note that the inclusion of the M5 motorway in the new pricing system cut market service prices: month on month, in March and
April as well, according to data provided by the CSO. If this effect is adjusted for, the annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rate of market service price
rises would be 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points higher in 2004 Q1 and Q2, respectively.
14 For further details on the expected food price effects related to Hungary’s accession to the EU see: Ferenczi, Jakab and Nagyné: Is there inflation ten-
sion in Hungarian food prices? The expected effects of Hungary’s accession to the EU, MNB Background Studies, 1/2002 (in Hungarian).
15 In terms of tobacco products, producer price changes appear in the statistics only gradually and with a delay, in line with the fact that the products of
changed prices hit the shelves only after earlier stocks are used up.
* The broken line illustrates our estimate of the price changes adjuster
for the direct effects of VAT.
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motor fuel prices are also explained by the low 2003
base prices.16
Increase in regulated prices is a major factor behind the
2004 Q1 CPI rise, however, it is connected primarily
with VAT rises. The indices adjusted for tax rises indi-
cate that in 2004 Q1 the faster rise in regulated prices,
which commenced in early 2003, continued, but in the
second quarter this trend broke. The underlying reason
was the freezing of pharmaceuticals prices at a lower
level than earlier.
2. 3. 1 INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Economic agents and professional forecasters held
rather different opinions in respect of expected infla-
tion. In line with the inflation peak in May and June,
nearly every poll established that perceived inflation
rose, but while market analysts and research institutions
characteristically increased their expectations, house-
holds and corporate managers assessed the inflationary
outlook as more favourable than previously.
The sudden rise in inflation in May exceeded even the
most pessimistic expectations. Relying on May and June
inflation data, market analysts and research institutes
corrected their projections for end-2004 upward by 0.3
percentage points and by 0.2 percentage points for
end-2005. With the current information in view, the
overwhelming majority of professional forecasters
(except for a single analyst) consider the objectives of
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank achievable by end-2005, and
expect inflation to move somewhere in the upper part
of the targeted band (4±1 per cent) in December 2005.
The corporate executives included in TÁRKI’s survey
continue to assess expected inflation more favourably
than previously. Despite the actual strong upswing in
inflation, the rate of inflation they perceived in the past
quarter did not rise any further, and their responses to
questions regarding expected price rises indicate a
gradual decrease since the second survey.17
While consumer prices most probably reached their
annual peaks in May and June 2004, according to GKI’s
polls in 2004 Q2 household inflation perceptions and
expectations gradually improved.
Similar shifts can be seen in inflation expectations in
TÁRKI’s survey of households, which also contains
questions on the level of price rises. In line with actual
Analysts’ relevant inflation projections for end-
2004 and 2005, on the basis of a Reuters survey
Percentage changes on a year earlier
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16 The motor fuels excise tax cut introduced by the Government with effect from June 2004 reduced motor fuel prices by approximately 1 per cent in
June.
17 The TÁRKI survey responses on perceived and expected wage inflation show similar growth rates.
Inflation perception and expectations 
by corporate executives
For the previous and the next 12 months
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inflation, perceptions have been rising since mid-2003,
but the May 2004 poll indicates that the trend of grad-
ually deteriorating inflation expectations appears to
have broken. Despite this decline in expectations, infla-
tion anticipated for the next twelve months continues to
be higher than the values typically stated prior to the
announcement of the indirect tax rises.
On the whole, corporate executives’ expectations
changed little, as they still anticipate an upcoming
decline in inflation. Polls of household inflation percep-
tions also indicate an improvement, but these data are
more difficult to interpret. In contrast to the May 2004
issue of the Report, professional analysts revised up
both their short-term and longer-term inflation projec-
tions.
Households’ perceived and expected inflation
based on the TÁRKI poll
For the previous and the next 12 months
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Assuming no change in the monetary conditions that pre-
vailed in July 2004 and that all other assumptions of the
main scenario apply, a gradual decline in inflation is pro-
jected over the forecast horizon. Disinflation will be par-
ticularly rapid in late 2004 and early 2005, after which it is
expected to be gradual and moderate. On the whole, the
annual CPI is expected to stand at around 6 per cent at
end-2004 and drop to 4–5 per cent by late 2005.18
The marked slowdown in the annual CPI in 2004 H2
will be due to base effects for the most part. A signifi-
cant reduction will occur in the index at end-2004 as
the high end-2003 unprocessed food and regulated
price indices are included in the base, whereas the
2005 Q1 index will decline considerably as indirect tax
rises drop out of the base.
Starting from 2005 Q1, the slowdown in core inflation
adjusted for tax effects will become the predominant
factor in the index. Declining unit labour costs will be the
primary factor promoting disinflation, however, a grad-
ual opening of the output gap will slightly counteract
their effect as this tends to boost inflationary pressure on
the demand side. In addition to a decline in core infla-
tion, a moderate rise in unprocessed food prices and the
gradually slowing increase in motor fuel prices may exert
downward pressure on the overall CPI.
With regard to the risks to our inflation projections, it is
important to highlight the uncertainty inherent in pri-
vate sector wages, fiscal policy, growth in household
consumption, and the expected price changes of
unprocessed foods and oil. The combination of these
factors determine to a great degree the risk distribution
of inflation in the future, i.e. the bands of the fan chart.
Looking at the time profile of different risks, in 2004
unprocessed food and oil prices are the most important
factors, while in 2005 fiscal policy is an additional, more
dominant source of uncertainty.
3.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECTIONS
18 For the technical details on the main scenario, its assumptions and change since the May Quarterly Report on Inflation, see Section 4.2.
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In comparison to the MNB’s May projection, it is clear
that our inflation outlook has risen over the horizon
relevant from a monetary policy perspective. While in
May 2004 the highest probability of inflation expected
for end-2005 was in the middle of the target band, the
current forecast envisages that price rises will most
likely fall in the upper domain of the target band.19
19 The July 2004 CPI data was published after the inflation projection had been finalised. The 7.2 per cent CPI was in line with our expectations, and thus
corroborates our forecast.
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In line with the MNB’s earlier practice, the projection
depicted in the main scenario is conditional. In compli-
ance with our projection rules, the August issue of the
Report assumes that the average July HUF/EUR (249.8)
and EUR/USD (1.23) exchange rates and interest rates
(11.5 per cent) remain unchanged over the entire hori-
zon. In agreement with the July futures course, oil prices
are assumed to gradually decline (to around 35
USD/barrel by the end of 2005) from the current high
price level (approximately 40 USD).
As the 2005 Budget Act is not yet available, the MNB’s
earlier rule is applied, whereby a 0.5 per cent drop in
the deficit is assumed for next year, pursuant to the gov-
ernment’s convergence programme.
3. 2. 1 EXPECTED TRENDS IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE
We expect export markets to expand dynamically over
the forecast horizon. Although the risk of a slowdown in
economic growth will increase if there is no drop in the
historically high oil prices, most recent data and
European business confidence indices suggest that the
current recovery should have a solid basis. The acceler-
ation of economic growth from 2004 to 2005 will be
due to base effects, for the most part, and in the next
two years the economy is expected to grow at a steady
rate, comparable with that seen in the period immedi-
ately preceding the 2001 recession.
The favourable conditions established by the external
recovery present an ideal opportunity for rapid develop-
ment in the Hungarian export sector. The MNB’s pro-
jection expects that Hungarian exporters will continue
to rapidly increase their share in the export markets,
though somewhat more slowly than in previous years.
For the most part, the increase in market share is
explained by earlier intensive foreign trade integration,
whereas over the past few quarters real depreciation
Table 3.1
Table 3.2
Summary table of major assumptions 
Main scenario
2002 2003 2004 2005
Fact Assumption
Normative fiscal tightening in 2005 (percentage point) n/a 0.5
HUF/EUR exchange rate (forint)* 242.9 253.5 253.0 249.8
USD/EUR exchange rate (cent)* 94.5 113.1 122.7 122.7
Brent oil price (US dollar/barrel)** 25.0 28.9 36.1 36.2
Import-based GDP-based
2003 2.6 0.6
2004 4.7 1.9
2005 5.9 2.2
Expected trends in external demand*
* Weighted for the foreign trade structure of exports.
3. 2 EXPECTED INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE MAIN SCENARIO
* Annual average on the basis of the fixed July average.
** Calculated on the basis of July futures prices for oil (IPE stock exchange).
Expected trends in the share in export markets*
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based on unit labour cost may have also facilitated this
trend.
Favourable sales possibilities are a pressing reason for
the corporate sector to carry out fixed investment, and
further impetus is given by the fact that firms have been
increasingly substituting labour – which has become
expensive over the past three years – with capital.
Owing to the above factors, a gradual increase in the
investment-to-GDP ratio is projected, although we do
not expect a continuation of the strikingly rapid capital
expansion seen in the past two quarters as well as at the
beginning of the previous recovery. This is because in
our assessment, just as in the case of exports, to a sub-
stantial extent the 1996–1999 investment boom was
due mainly to temporary and relocation-related factors,
which are not expected to be lasting.
Favourable business cycle conditions are expected to
boost corporate labour demand as well. Nevertheless, a
number of factors stand in the way of dynamic growth
in employment. The aforementioned recent strong
wage inflation has raised labour costs, which, in turn,
has pressed companies into substituting labour with
capital. Another consequence of this trend which is typ-
ical of manufacturing, is that there is a shortage of a
skilled labour required to operate the substantial por-
tion of the expanded production capacities. As men-
tioned in the section on labour market, skill mismatch
may put gradual pressure on wage inflation in the
future. Although at the aggregate level no bottleneck
can be detected in the labour market, corporate sector
growth will only be accompanied by a moderate
increase in employment and there will be unrelenting
pressure on wages due to skill mismatch.
Accordingly, private sector wage inflation is projected
to slow at a moderate pace over the forecast horizon,
as employment gradually increases. As a consequence
of the acceleration in wage inflation at end-2003 and
early 2004, the annual average index is expected to
exceed the corresponding data for 2003, despite the
gradual slowdown in wage inflation. The primary reason
for this is that based on the actual data provided by the
CSO, private sector wage increases slightly exceeded
10 per cent in the first five months of 2004, and this
defines the annual trends to such an extent that even if
quarterly wage growth declines, no significant drop can
be expected in the annual index.20 Following an annual
average growth rate of 9 per cent in 2003, 10 and 9 per
cent rates of wage growth are expected for 2004 and
2005, respectively. In terms of this wage growth, private
sector real labour costs are expected to expand at
roughly the same rate as average productivity in
2004–2005.
The total wage bill is expected to grow more slowly in
the public sector than in the private sector, as accord-
ing to our normative assumption a decline in employ-
ment and compared to the private sector, lower wage
increases are projected.
Disposable household income grows at a relatively
moderate pace this year, as the 2004 rise in inflation
lessens real wage growth compared to the past few
years. A moderate increase in real disposable income is
expected for 2005, as inflation slows down substantial-
ly, while the slowdown in wage inflation follows only
part of this decline.
Corporate sector investment ratio*
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As a result, the growth rate in household consumption
will fall to half or one-third of the rate recorded in 2003.
Household consumption is projected to increase at a
rate of 2.2 per cent in 2004, and around 2.5 per cent in
2005. As a result of regulatory changes introduced in
late 2003, household investment activity is anticipated
to slow gradually. In the course of 2004, the after-
effects of previously issued building permits and con-
struction projects already commenced will still be an
important determinant. Consequently, a decline is to be
expected only from late 2004. As the propensity to save
is assumed to gradually rise in the wake of strikingly low
values recorded in the past few years, owing primarily
to more modest investment activity, and thus a gradual
increase is projected in net financial savings.21
The general government has a restrictive impact on the
economy this year, as the contraction in demand in
2004 may amount to more than 1.5 per cent of GDP,
in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. As mentioned
above, based on the relevant normative fiscal assump-
tion, a 0.5 per cent drop in the deficit is assumed for
2005 (but the amount of demand contraction will be
lower than this as the decline in the interest rate bal-
ance may improve equilibrium). Thus, in 2005 the gov-
ernment’s influence on the business cycle will remain
relatively moderate.22
As a result of the above described trends, economic
growth is expected to accelerate to 3.8 per cent in
2004. For the most part, this increase will result from an
upswing in whole-economy fixed investment. In com-
parison to 3 per cent in 2003, the average investment
index is expected to rise above 10 per cent this year. As
mentioned above, with the current recovery, corporate
fixed investment will experience robust growth in 2004,
and the slowdown in household fixed investment is like-
ly to be felt only at around the end of the year.
Government fixed investment will also be restricted
only gradually. Although exports will also grow rapidly
due to the favourable conditions stemming from the
external recovery, net exports will have a slightly
adverse impact on growth this year, due to the demand
for imports necessary for dynamic investment activity.
In 2005, economic growth is expected to stabilize at
around 3.6 per cent. Even though the investment rate
rises continuously over the forecast horizon, as soon as
the outstanding end-2003 and early 2004 data drop out
of the base, annual corporate fixed investment data will
be substantially lower. The decline in household fixed
investment and limitations on government projects will
further hamper national fixed investment. As a result,
the double-digit fixed investment indicator for 2004 is
likely to fall to around 4 per cent in 2005. A slight accel-
eration in consumption arising from the faster increase
Household consumption expenditure 
and disposable income at real value*
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in real incomes will somewhat counteract this trend.
Net exports are also envisaged to change for the posi-
tive, supporting GDP growth.
Under the aforementioned conditions, external balance
only improves slightly this year because of the massive
investment activity. With the slowdown of fixed invest-
ment in 2005, external equilibrium will improve more
significantly.23
3. 2. 2 CAPACITIES AND THE OUTPUT GAP
In an assessment of inflation and longer-term eco-
nomic growth expectations, it is indispensable to
take stock of the production capacities of the econ-
omy, or in other words, to quantify potential GDP.
According to our calculations potential GDP will grow
by roughly three to four per cent annually. This is partly
due to the aforementioned rapid growth in corporate
fixed investment, which increases the production capac-
ity of the economy by raising the capital stock. In terms
of labour, the economically active population is expect-
ed to increase slowly, and as our estimate of the equi-
librium rate of unemployment does not change over the
forecast horizon, the growth pace of the active popula-
tion will also determine labour increase. Other factors
do not have a significant impact on potential GDP
changes, as in connection with economic convergence,
slightly declining growth is expected in technological
development over the forecast horizon.
A comparison of the estimate of potential GDP and the
projection of actual GDP reveals that in 2004 actual
GDP growth will outstrip the expansion in potential
GDP, whereas in 2005 it will grow at roughly the same
rate. As according to our estimate the level of actual
GDP fell somewhat below potential in 2003, from its
current slightly negative position, the output gap will
gradually shift to the positive domain, and increase infla-
tionary pressure on the demand side.
Potential GDP and the output gap
Table 3.3
Projections in the main scenario
* Change in an SNA primary balance, corrected with changes in payments of private pensions.
** Net real income of households is proxied by the sum of the net wage bill and financial transfers.
*** CSO labour force survey.
**** Weighted average of manufacturing and market services.
23 For a detailed analysis of the external disequilibrium, see Section 4.4.
Potential GDP and its determinant factors*
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2003 2004 2005
Economic growth
Household consumption 6.5 2.2 2.5
Gross fixed capital formation 3.0 11.4 3.9
Domestic absorption 5.5 4.4 2.8
Exports 7.2 12.2 9.5
Imports 10.3 12.3 8.2
GDP 2.9 3.8 3.6
General government
Demand impact* -0.1 -1.7 -0.3
Household sector
Real disposable income of households** 8.1 2.5 3.6
Labour market
Whole-economy wage inflation 10.9 9.5 8.5
Whole-economy employment*** 1.2 0.5 0.2
(Private sector) unit labour costs**** 4.4 5.9 4.8
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The production capacity of an economy is characterised
by the so-called potential GDP. The output gap is usually
defined as the percentage difference between actual and
potential GDP. Thus, the latter indicates how current eco-
nomic growth stands in relation to capacities.
The term ‘potential GDP’ has several meanings in the
literature. In the so-called production function
approach, potential GDP denotes the volume of out-
put that can be realised at a specified level of technol-
ogy, labour supply and capital stock. Most frequently
this is calculated from an (estimated) production func-
tion, which gives potential GDP24 if the formula is sub-
stituted with the figures for capital stock and the
(potential) labour supply.25
In another approach potential GDP can be charac-
terised by its – not necessarily linear – trend. The
underlying assumption for this approach is that over
the long term economic output fluctuates around a
trend, and therefore potential GDP can be described
by the long-term trend embodied in a time series.26
Potential GDP in this approach can be estimated by
time series methods.
The third and most frequently used approach views
potential GDP as a level of income realised if both
prices and wages adjusted flexibly, without any sticki-
ness. The difference between GDP values realised
under the actual and the flexible price/wage condi-
tions appear as price and/or wage pressures.
Clearly, the three different approached highlight differ-
ent features of the ‘potential’ in an economy. The pro-
duction function approach takes production opportu-
nities as a point of origin, while output at a flexible
price takes inflationary pressure as a starting point.
Potential GDP calculated by time series methods
relies on the cyclical features of economies.
The three methods have certain common features. For
instance, the similarity between the approaches of
potential GDP realised at flexible prices and the one
based on the production function is that both operate
with labour supply at the so-called natural instead of
the actual rate of unemployment.
In the projection practice of the MNB (the Hungarian
Quarterly Projection Model – N.E.M.) potential GDP
is calculated on a production function basis. A so-
called Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) produc-
tion function is used. The capital/labour substitution
parameter is estimated from the labour supply func-
tion (as the optimum labour and capital demand at
maximum profit can be obtained from this specific
function). In addition to these, the production function
includes the active labour force (expressed in demo-
graphic factors), adjusted for the natural rate of unem-
ployment (NAIRU). The latter is estimated by time
series methods. The capital stock variable (calculated
by the MNB) is a sum total of the capital stocks of the
private and public sectors.27 Technological develop-
ment is interpreted as a labour-augmenting technolog-
ical development, the historical cost of which is esti-
mated on the basis of shares of national accounts in
income.
Box 3.1
24 For a description of the production function used in the Hungarian Quarterly Projection Model (N.E.M.) see Jakab, M. Z., Kovács, M. A., Párkányi, B.,
Reppa, Z. and Vadas, G. (2004) ‘The Hungarian Quarterly Projection Model (N.E.M.) – Non-technical summary’, MNB forthcoming. The Cobb-Douglas
production function was calibrated for the Hungarian economy in: Darvas, Zs. and Simon, A. (1999) ‘A növekedés makrogazdasági feltételei –
Gazdaságpolitikai alternatívák’ (The macroeconomic conditions of growth – Economic policy alternatives), Working Papers 3/1999.
25 The ‘potential labour supply’ is a labour supply where the unemployment rate is at the so-called natural level.
26 For the estimates for the Hungarian economy resulting from this method see e.g. Darvas, Zs. and Vadas, G. (2003) ‘Univariate Potential GDP
Estimations for Hungary’, Working Papers, 8/2003; and Darvas, Zs. and Simon, A. (2000) ‘A potenciális kibocsátás becslése a gazdaság nyitottságának
felhasználásával’ (Estimation of potential GDP relying on the openness of the economy), Working Papers, 9/2000.
27 For details of the estimation, see Pula, G. (2003) ‘A tõkeállomány becslése Magyarországon a PIM módszerrel. Módszertani leírás és eredmények’
(Capital stock estimation by the PIM method in Hungary. A description of the method and results), Working Papers, 7/2003.
3. 2. 3 DETAILS OF THE MAIN SCENARIO 
INFLATION FORECAST
If the assumptions of the main scenario described
above are valid, consumer price inflation will slow
down to 6.1 and 4.4 per cent by the end of 2004 and
2005, respectively. Instead of core inflation, the slow-
down in late 2004 will essentially be governed by the
technical effect of the inclusion of robust price rises
affecting regulated products and unprocessed foods
into the base at end-2003. By contrast, in the course of
2004 core inflation is not expected to exhibit a major
decline. Reasons for this include that, on the one hand,
most of the 2004 H2 data are already given because of
the inertia in short-term price changes, and on the
other, because demand and supply trends are unlikely
to see major changes in the coming two quarters.
Nevertheless, in 2005 Q1, both CPI and core inflation
will decelerate considerably as a result of the exclusion
of the impact of rises in indirect taxes from the base. In
the course of 2005, further gradual, moderate disinfla-
tion is expected. Disinflation will be fuelled primarily by
a decline in core inflation, fundamentally caused by
decreasing nominal unit labour costs. Simultaneously,
the rise in the output gap will slightly offset disinflation
on the demand side. In our main scenario, disinflation
will also be facilitated by a decline in oil prices, as they
directly reduce the motor fuel price index and indirectly
relieve inflationary pressure in terms of general costs.
Having consulted agricultural experts, we expect a grad-
ual decline in the prices of unprocessed foods.
Technically speaking, this will take the form of a slow
decrease in the annual indices, which will then turn neg-
ative or stagnate.
A slowdown is expected in regulated prices in the
course of 2005 compared to the previous year, primari-
ly because no change is assumed in the prices of sub-
sidised pharmaceuticals and telephones over the fore-
cast horizon.28
In our main scenario, from end-2004 to end-2005 the
constant tax based consumer price index (CTI) will
decline only slightly, clearly indicating that the overall
two percentage point decline in the headline index is
largely caused by the base effect of indirect tax increas-
es in 2004.
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Table 3.4
CPI and its major constituents in the main scenario
2004 2005
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec.
CPI 6.8 7.3 7.1 6.4 6.1 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.4 4.4
Core inflation* 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.3 5.2 4.9 4.7
Unprocessed food 4.9 8.0 12.1 3.5 0.8 -0.5 -1.4 -4.7 -1.3 1.5
Motor fuels and market-priced energy 1.0 7.8 7. 8 8.8 7.6 5.3 2.8 1.9 1.6 1.3
Products with regulated prices 11.7 10.1 8.5 7.6 7.5 3.8 4.7 5.4 5.5 5.5
* For technical reasons, the core inflation measures projected may deviate from the CSO core index temporarily, but in general it follows the same
trend. For more information, see Section 4.2.1.
Table 3.5
2004 Q4 2005 Q4
Consumer price index 6.4 4.4
Constant tax based price index 4.3 4.1
Consumer price index and constant tax index*
* Percentage change compared to the previous year.
28 Following from the MNB’s projection rules, in the case of items for which no detailed information is available on changes in regulated prices, an MNB-
estimated historical relationship is used, which assumes that the prices of such items rise at a rate 1.3 times higher than core inflation.
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Starting from August, the MNB’s Quarterly Report on
Inflation will be published in a new, more compact for-
mat. The Monetary Council has endorsed these
changes. The new structure is based on (i) the lessons
learnt from earlier Hungarian practices; (ii) the experi-
ences of other central banks using inflation targeting;
and (iii) the conclusions of a CEPR survey29 comparing
national central banks’ inflation reports.
4. 1. 1 WHY RESTRUCTURE?
An analysis of readers’ feedback and the practices fol-
lowed by central banks which publish inflation reports
reveals that the most well-received reports tend to be
those that are short and easy to understand. Moreover,
such reports usually present a thorough analysis of actu-
al data, yet are less detailed when it comes to the pro-
jections. Instead, they concentrate on providing a
description of the key mechanisms.
Viewed in an international context, the old version of
the Report published by the MNB was twice as long as
those published in other countries, which was due to
the fact that the projections sections of the MNB’s
Reports were longer and that the structure of these sec-
tions was different. More specifically, while in other
countries the projections and the analysis of actual data
are dealt with in separate sections, the MNB’s Quarterly
Report on Inflation integrated these two components
into single sections (Economic activity, Labour market,
Inflation).
What was the philosophy behind the earlier Hungarian
practice, which deviated to some degree from interna-
tional trends? At the time of its introduction of the infla-
tion targeting regime by the MNB, it provided some sort
of technical credibility, and so it seemed absolutely
imperative to present the projections in meticulous
detail. In that context, it was reasonable to treat the
analysis of actual data and the projections within a sin-
gle editorial framework, as the other option of loading a
single section with detailed information seemed less
viable.
Over the long run, however, publishing a Report which
is more compact and easier to follow is likely to be
more beneficial.
4. 1. 2 WHAT ARE THE CHANGES?
Turning to the details, starting from the August issue of
the Report the macroeconomic projections will
become shorter and will be presented in a separate sec-
tion, in line with international practice, while actual data
for the review period will be set forth in the preceding
section. Within the latter section, separate sub-sections
will be devoted to economic activity (demand and out-
put), the labour market and inflation.
The proposed changes represent a shift towards interna-
tional practice, and are consistent with the MNB’s own
forecasting practice, which are increasingly based on an
aggregate correlation rather than on the assessment of
disaggregated impacts. This will provide a unified view
of the MNB’s projections.
As of August, analysis of actual data and the projections
will only focus on the so-called fiscal demand impact,
which is the only fiscal factor with some relevance to
the understanding of inflation developments on this
horizon. Deficit indicators and specific fiscal policy
issues will be discussed in a separate sub-section under
Special topics. Similarly, Hungary’s external balance will
be analysed in a separate sub-section also under the
Special topics section of the Report. These changes will
enable Bank staff to use these sub-sections to examine
more general longer-term issues which are not neces-
sarily linked directly to the inflation projection (e.g.
debt, issues related to sustainability, etc.).
Already featuring in the May issue of the Report, the sub-
section entitled ‘Background information on the projec-
tions’ will also be affixed to the Special topics section.
This sub-section of the Report will also regularly include
our inflation projection based on analysts’ expectations
of monetary conditions. This approach is also used by the
central banks of the UK, Brazil and Norway and has the
4. 1 CHANGES TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
29 Fracasso, A., Genberg, H. and Wyplosz, Ch. (2003) ‘How do central banks write? An Evaluation of Inflation Targeting Central Banks’ Geneva Reports
on the World Economy Special Report 2.
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advantage of providing a framework for comparing the
Bank’s conditional projections with the market’s projec-
tions which are not subject to conditions. Thus, with fore-
casts based on the market’s expectations of monetary
conditions, it is clearly discernable to what extent the dif-
ference between the projections by the central bank and
the market arises from differences between these
assumptions of the forecasts, or are attributable to differ-
ences in the projection models used.
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4. 2. 1 CHANGES IN THE AUGUST PROJECTION
COMPARED TO MAY 2004
The effects of macro-economic information from the
period following publication of the May Report on our
projections can be summarised as follows: while
Hungary’s growth outlook improved, the main macro-
economic conditions determining the disinflation path
worsened perceptibly, mainly due to the upturn in the
global business cycle. As several economic trends, men-
tioned among the upward risks in May (e.g. oil prices,
wage inflation) which reinforce each other persisted, we
4. 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PROJECTIONS
Changes in central projections relative to May
Annual changes, in percentage, unless otherwise noted
Table 4.1
1 In our current projection for 2005 we assume a conditional path, based on the Convergence Programme submitted to the European Commission,
which calculates an annual 0.5 percent GDP-proportionate improvement in the ESA-based deficit in this year.
2 Change in the SNA primary balance, corrected with changes in payments of private pensions.
3 We use our estimation for wage inflation in general government; accordingly, the thirteenth-month salary for 2004, to be disbursed in January
2005, has been added to the 2004 wage data.
4 Weighted average of manufacturing and market services.
5 According to CSO labour force survey.
6 Real net income has been approximated with sum of net wage bill and social transfers in cash.
2003 2004 2005
Actual Projection
May Actual May Actual
Consumer price index (CPI)
December 5.7 6.0 6.1 4.0 4.4
Annual average 4.7 6.9 6.9 4.3 4.5
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.6 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.2
Household consumption 6.5 2.1 2.2 1.1 2.5
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 7.6 2.7 2.9 1.3 3.0
Gross fixed capital formation 3.0 9.2 11.4 3.2 3.9
Domestic absorption 5.5 3.4 4.4 1.9 2.8
Exports 7.2 10.8 12.2 9.2 9.5
Imports 10.3 10.3 12.3 7.1 8.2
GDP 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.6
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 8.9 8.3 8.8 7.1 8.0
EUR billions 6.5 6.7 7.2 6.2 7.0
General government (as a percentage of GDP)
ESA-deficit1 5.9 5.3 5.4 4.8 4.9
Demand impact2 (-0.1) (-1.6) (-1.7) (-0.3) (-0.3)
Labour market
National economy total wage inflation3 10.9 8.1 9.5 6.8 8.5
National economy total employment 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.2
Private sector wage inflation4 8.7 8.4 10.2 7.1 9.2
Private sector unit labour cost4 4.4 4.0 5.9 3.1 4.8
Private sector employment5 0.7 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.4
Net real income of households6 8.1 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.6
54 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
4 SPECIAL TOPICS
4
slightly revised upward our projection for year-end
2004 inflation, and more significantly upward for 2005.
Our assessment of the state of external and internal
economic equilibrium also worsened, and therefore we
changed our projections in the case of both of the rele-
vant measures (general government and current
account deficit) in the direction of slower improvement.
Changes in technical assumptions
In contrast to the May projection, the changes in our
technical assumptions concerning the exchange rate
path (HUF/EUR and USD/EUR) did not have a consid-
erable effect on the current projections.
At the same time, in the past few months world oil
prices have increased significantly, due to supply and
demand processes in global oil markets. Since in our
technical assumption we employ futures prices for
expected oil prices, the increase in world market prices
resulted in a similar increase in hypothetical oil prices
over the projection horizon. Higher oil prices charac-
teristically increase consumer prices on a cost-push
basis, but in a small, open country the effects of the
real economy must also be taken into consideration.30
As far as wage growth is concerned, up until the previ-
ous Report we expected that wage setting would quick-
ly adapt to the anticipated lower-inflation environment.
Events did not confirm this assumption, and therefore
we currently project a much more persistent wage path
characterised by a slower decrease in wage inflation.
The stronger growth of wages exercised a particularly
significant effect on the more distant periods of our pro-
jection (1–1.5 years).
Changes in real economy projections
The first quarter gross domestic product figure exceed-
ed our earlier expectations. Although the calendar-
effect – due to the leap year – may have had a consid-
erable influence on the outstandingly high growth, the
positive development was primarily driven by corporate
decisions on production and capital expenditures,
which reacted to the effects of global upswing more
quickly and robustly than expected. Following the
exceptionally high growth rate at end-2003 and in con-
trast to the experiences of the previous years, corporate
investment continued to exhibit dynamic growth in the
first quarter as well.
Although household consumption growth was lower
than expected, due mainly to one-off factors, we adjust-
ed the consumption path for this sector slightly upward
for this year and more significantly upward for next
year, primarily in light of the fact that wage inflation sig-
nificantly exceeded our May projections. This new
wage path, delineated to a great degree by increasing
private sector wages, justifies stronger-than-expected
income growth over our projection horizon, which may
have a significant impact on the consumption decisions
of households as well.
30 See more on the economic effects of oil prices in Section 4.8.
Changes in the major assumptions of our projections relative to May
Table 4.2
May 2004 projection Current projection Change (percentage)
2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
Normative fiscal tightening in 2005 
(as a percentage of GDP. basis points) n/a -0.5 n/a -0.5 n/a 0.0
HUF/EUR exchange rate (HUF)* 252.8 250.3 253.0 249.8 +0.1 -0.2
(Our assumption**) (250.3) (250.3) (249.8) (249.8) (-0.2) (-0.2)
USD/EUR exchange rate (cents)* 121.3 120.0 122.7 122.7 +1.2 +2.3
(Our assumption**) (120.0) (120.0) (122.7) (122.7) (+2.3) (+2.3)
Price of Brent oil (USD/barrel) 32.3 29.5 36.1 36.2 +11.7 +22.6
Memo: Price of Brent oil (forint/barrel) 6730 6156 7429 7364 +10.4 +19.6
Imported inflation of tradable goods 
(per cent)*** 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
* Annual average exchange rate.
** According to our technical assumption we use the last full month average exchange rate for the entire forecast horizon. In the current projec-
tion our calculations are based on the July 2004 average.
*** Average annualised monthly domestic growth rates. Euro area-11 goods inflation. Source: Eurostat, New Cronos Code: igoodsxe
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In Section 2.2, we noted that our estimate of wage infla-
tion in 2004 H1 has changed significantly compared to
May. Based on new information on wages in the March-
May period, which arrived after the wage data for
February, wage inflation accelerated and the timing of
non-regular wage payments changed as well.
Evaluating wage developments is rendered even more
difficult due to the fact that, as the CSO noted in its
data release of 16 July, many companies decided to
pay the one-off remunerations and bonuses in March,
which would have otherwise been due in May in line
with the practice followed in recent years. This change
increased the headline wage index for March, and led
to a corresponding decline in the May figure.
This change in remuneration practices is also reflected
by statistics on non-regular wage payments and our
studies using the time series method. It is clear that this
phenomenon primarily affected manufacturing, and
more particularly the chemical industry, where the
remunerations and bonuses paid in March of this year
significantly exceeded the generally characteristic pro-
portion to gross wages, while the May payments were
considerably below average.
Adjustments to compensate for this seasonal shift
were made using statistical methods. On the whole,
these adjustments did not result in a change in wages
paid in the first five months of the year, but the extra
payments made in March were taken into account in
May, in line with the earlier seasonality. This adjust-
ment was necessary in order to obtain a clearer pic-
ture of longer-term wage inflation processes, without
distortion from seasonal components.
The chart below clearly shows that, based on the annu-
al indices of average income resulting from our calcu-
lations, adjusted for temporary effects and seasonality,
private sector wage inflation gradually accelerated in
the first half of 2004. In contrast to this, the CSO’s orig-
inal non-corrected, non-adjusted data show a spike in
wage inflation in the first quarter, followed by a sudden
sharp downturn in the second quarter.
An annualised, short-based index of average wages
provide a more precise picture of the underlying
processes. On the basis of the seasonally adjusted
data, this indicator attempts to capture the wage
dynamics of the economy in line with the trends
occurring within a single quarter. The main advantage
is that it does not have a base-year effect, as it is not
related to the same period of the previous year.
Accordingly, it shows the turning points more quickly
than the traditional annual index. Its drawback, howev-
er, is the fact that as it is an estimated figure (due to
the seasonal adjustments), it is subject to revision as
new data become available.
In the chart below it is evident that the data coming in
since the May Report significantly modified our view of
past developments in wage inflation. Based on the
actual data for the past three months (since February)
it is clear that wage inflation has grown significantly
quicker since the beginning of 2003 as compared to
our May estimate, and currently stands at 10 per cent.
This evaluation is also confirmed by the fact that
Box 4.1
What are the factors behind the change in our
wage inflation estimates?
Growth rate of average private sector wages
Annual change
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Change of our projected wage inflation
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The combined effect of the above-mentioned factors
(higher-than-expected first quarter GDP, significantly
higher capital investment activities, slower decline in
household consumption) leads us to adopt a more
favourable growth outlook for this year, while only
slightly increasing our projections for the 2005 growth
rate, due to base period effects.
The stronger-than-expected rebound in domestic
absorption – in particular capital expenditures – has
considerably changed our previous views regarding
Hungary’s external economic equilibrium in 2004.
Higher capital expenditure activities and the presum-
ably softer ‘landing’ in consumption significantly
increases the economy’s demand for imports, while our
slightly higher exports projection is mostly a result of the
better-than-expected first quarter figures. The changes
in 2005 are predominantly due to base period effects
on the export side and to our projections of higher
household consumption on the import side.
Compared to the earlier projections, our estimate of
potential GDP was changed as well. In reviewing the
calculation methods, we revised our estimate for the
capital stock downward, consequently leading to lower
potential output for Hungarian economy as well.
Accordingly, our projections (in contrast to the last issue
of the Report) assume that from the second half of 2004
on there will be a small, but positive so-called ‘output
gap’ (i.e. actual economic output will exceed the level
justified by the expansion of production factors). The
higher-than-expected actual growth will increase
demand-pull inflation pressure.
Changes to the inflation projection
Compared to May, we have slightly changed our pro-
jected inflation figure for December 2004 and
increased the end-2005 figure by 0.4 percentage points.
Our assessment of the longer-term inflationary process-
es was predominantly influenced by changes in the
anticipated real economic processes, and in terms of
the short-term inflation outlook by rising prices for some
exogenous factors (from the point of view of monetary
policy).
Core inflation31 in the second quarter was in line with
our earlier projections, while the overall consumer price
index slightly exceeded our expectations, by 0.1 per-
centage points, due to dynamic rises in unprocessed
food prices. Since actual price development during the
period was practically in line with our expectations, our
projections were characteristically influenced over the
short run by the changes in the basic assumptions.
Among these, it was the increase in oil prices that main-
ly had a significant effect. In terms of key exogenous
items, only the higher-than-expected unprocessed food
prices have a considerable effect, while our exchange
rate assumption remains practically unchanged.
The reasons for increasing our projection for inflation at
end-2005 by close to 0.4 percentage points include the
impact of a substantially higher-than-expected assump-
tion for oil prices and trends in supply and demand. It is
mainly the effect of our higher wage inflation projec-
tion, compared to May, which plays a dominant role in
the latter factor. The reason for this is that it fuels infla-
tion on both the cost side (in the services sector, in par-
ticular) and the demand side (driven by expanding
household consumption).
Developments in other items (e.g. a slightly stronger
HUF/EUR exchange rate, compared to the May projec-
tion, and expected lower prices of pharmaceuticals,
owing to government decisions) could have con-
tributed to a lower inflation projection in 2005, but
these items do not seem to exert a significant impact
over the forecast period.
4. 2. 2 EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE INTEREST- AND
EXCHANGE RATE PATHS ON OUR PROJECTIONS
As usual, in our projections we assume that both the
exchange rate and the central bank base rate remain
stable over the projection horizon. Accordingly, these
factors can only be directly compared to other projec-
according to the CSO the average private sector wage
index for the first five months was 10.2 per cent.
As wage inflation was found to be higher in the recent
past than postulated in our previous Report, our pro-
jections for the next two years naturally increased, in
spite of the fact that in a qualitative sense we did not
alter our projection of a future slow-down of wage
inflation (see Section 3.2.1).
31 For reasons of methodology, the indicator under review, may in the short term be different from the one published by the CSO. Over the longer term,
however, both follow identical trends. The cause of the technical discrepancy is that the core inflation calculated by the CSO cannot be reproduced accu-
rately from available group CPI data, since the CSO breaks down several groups into core inflation items and sub-items (e.g. pharmaceuticals) are
excluded from it. Therefore, we have adopted a single approximation in our projection. In respect of the trends, this will not result in any departure from
the core inflation value published by the CSO over the long run. More specifically, the MNB’s forecast for core inflation covers 67.6 per cent, whereas
CSO’s 65.8 per cent of the consumer basket. This, however, leaves the MNB’s forecast for the total CPI unaffected, the only implication being the
rearrangement of the categories that the Bank uses for its analyses (e.g. those of regulated prices and core inflation).
57QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
4 SPECIAL TOPICS
4
tions, if the projections in question – for instance, those
of market analysts – also assume unchanged monetary
conditions. However, many existing projections are not
prepared based on this assumption, i.e. they also
attempt to project as best as possible central bank reac-
tions to economic processes and conditions.
In the following, we attempt to formulate a basis for the
comparison with such projections. Accordingly, we show
how our projections would change if we sacrificed our
assumption of fixed interest rates and exchange rates to
a certain extent (please note that in these simulations we
did not change our projections for fiscal policy).
For both the exchange rate and the interest rate, in the
simulation we used the average expected exchange
rate and interest rate paths of the Reuters survey in
July. At the end of 2005 the exchange rate is some 2
per cent weaker while the interest rate is about 3 per-
centage points lower than assumed in the main sce-
nario.
Using the Reuters survey-based assumptions, our pro-
jections would not change considerably. For the aver-
age price increase in 2005 we would project a 0.1–0.2
percentage point higher value, while the 2005 year-end
figure would change by 0.2–0.3 percentage points.
4. 2. 3 PROJECTIONS BY MNB VERSUS OTHER
INSTITUTIONS32
When the MNB’s projections are compared to those of
other institutions or market analysts we find that in
terms of the 2004 inflation outlook the central bank’s
forecast is in the lower range, while in terms of equilib-
rium measures (public sector and current account
deficit) it continues to be the highest. Our inflation pro-
jection for year-end 2005 is in the middle range of the
analysts’ projections.
The fact that our inflation projection for year-end 2005,
which was still in the lower range of analysts’ projec-
tions in May, has moved towards the middle of the
range (i.e. higher inflation) is mainly the result of adjust-
ments in the real economic and wage inflation outlook.
As the 2005 budget is not yet available, we do not have
a most probable projection for the 2005 general gov-
ernment deficit. Therefore, it is not expedient to com-
pare the normative path applied by the MNB (obtained
by deducting the projected tightening of 0.5 per cent
from the 2004 GDP-proportionate ESA deficit) to the
projections of other analysts.
Exchange rate path according to Reuters survey
and fixed rate assumption
Chart 4.3
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32 It must be borne in mind that the MNB projections cannot fully be compared to the projections of other institutions. The projections prepared by the
MNB are conditional, while other institutions usually make unconditional projections. The divergence between the MNB and the other institutions is not
only caused by differences in the assessment of current and expected trends, but also results from differences between the MNB’s basic assumptions and
other institutes’ projections on variables that are exogenous from our perspective.
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Comparison of the central projection of the MNB and other projections*
Table 4.3
* MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore MNB’s projections cannot always be directly compared to other projections.
1 Consensus Economics Inc. (London) ‘Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts’ gave their current account balance projections in US dollars, which
we converted at the June and March 2004 EUR/USD rate. The European Commission and the IMF apparently still project the current account
balance without re-invested revenues, calculated in accordance with the earlier method.
Sources: Consensus Economics Inc. (London) Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (July 21, 2004); European Commission Economic Forecasts,
Spring 2004; IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2004); OECD Economic Outlook (May 2004); Reuters survey, July 2004. World Bank EU-8
Quarterly Economic Report (July 2004).
2004 2005
Consumer price index (CPI) (December on December, percent)
MNB 6.1 4.4
Reuters survey (July 2004) 6.3 4.5
Consumer price index (average annual increase, percent)
MNB 6.9 4.5
Consensus Economics (July 2004) 6.8 4.5
European Commission (April 2004) 6.9 4.7
IMF (April 2004) 7.1 4.4
OECD (May 2004) 6.9 4.8
Reuters survey (July 2004) 6.9 4.6
World Bank (July 2004) 6.5 4.9
GDP (annual growth, per cent)
MNB 3.8 3.6
Consensus Economics (July 2004) 3.6 3.8
European Commission (April 2004) 3.2 3.4
IMF (April 2004) 3.2 3.4
OECD (May 2004) 3.3 3.8
Reuters survey (July 2004) 3.8 4.0
World Bank (July 2004) 3.2 3.7
Current account deficit (in EUR billions)
MNB 7.2 7.0
Consensus Economics (July 2004)1 6.2 5.8
Reuters survey (July 2004) 6.7 6.2
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 8.8 8.0
European Commission (April 2004)1 5.4 5.1
IMF (April 2004)1 5.3 4.3
OECD (May 2004) 8.5 7.6
World Bank (July 2004) 8.2 8.0
Public sector deficit (according to ESA-95, as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 5.4 4.9
Consensus Economics (July 2004) 5.0 4.4
European Commission (April 2004) 4.9 4.3
OECD (May 2004) 5.2 4.6
Reuters survey (July 2004) 5.0 4.5
World Bank (July 2004) 5.2 4.6
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As we provided a detailed forecast for the fiscal path in
2004 and 2005 in the May Report, we shall now focus
on the changes that have occurred with regard to this
forecast.
Our central projection continues to be a conditional
one in the sense that it provides a projection of the
deficit based on fiscal developments. Thus, it cannot
take into account the possibility that the Ministry of
Finance will take further measures in 2004 H2 to meet
the established deficit target.
In our central projection, the Government’s ESA-based
deficit target (4.6 per cent of GDP) for 2004 is unlikely
to be met unless further measures to improve the bal-
ance are implemented as the year progresses. Assuming
that no further measures are taken, we slightly revised
up our projection for both cash flow basis (GFS) and
accrual basis (ESA) general government deficit (6.6 and
5.4 per cent as a per cent of GDP, respectively) in 2004,
relative to the May Report.
In 2004, fiscal policy will greatly contribute to the grad-
ual adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances by way
of a pronounced reduction in aggregate demand. At the
time being, fiscal contraction of demand, i.e. what is
called the annual reduction in the augmented (SNA) pri-
mary balance, is estimated to be somewhat stronger
(1.7 per cent of GDP), relative to the May Report; how-
ever, this is explained by the modification of our esti-
mate of the augmented (SNA) deficit for last year rather
than for this year.
We continued to make assumptions for accrual based
adjustment to the ESA and GFS balances in 2004 and
2005. For 2004, we have accepted the extent of the
adjustment published by the Ministry of Finance (1.2
per cent of GDP). Relying on past adjustments, we for-
mulated a technical estimate for 2005 (0.4 per cent).
These estimates are, however, highly tentative, as the
CSO methodology is not yet definitive.
As there is neither an approved budget for 2005 nor a
detailed draft bill of the budget, our forecast for the
2005 government deficit continues to be based on the
assumption presented in May. Compared to the ESA
balance forecasted for 2004, our conditional fiscal path
for 2005 assumes a 0.5 per cent improvement in the
4. 3 DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT INDICATORS
33 For a detailed treatment of the deficit indicators used here, see the August 2003 issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation, pp. 76–77. If the CSO defines
the state-owned companies that perform certain tasks for the government as part of general government (the possibility of which was raised by the
Ministry of Finance in what is called the 2005 budgetary planning circular on its website), this may affect the ESA-based general government deficit and
outstanding debts. This is a project currently underway at the CSO; actual decisions may well have a retrospective impact.
Fiscal indicators
As a per cent of GDP33
Table 4.4
Preliminary data Forecast Assumption 
for 2003 for 2004 for 2005*
1) GFS deficit -5.9 -6.6 -5.3
2) ESA corrections 0.0 +1.2 +0.4
3) ESA deficit (1+2) -5.9 -5.4 -4.9
4) Adjustment for temporary items -1.3 -0.6 -0.3
5) Quasi-fiscal expenditure -1.5 -1.1 -1.4
6) Augmented (SNA) deficit (3+4+5) -8.7 -7.1 -6.6
7) Augmented (SNA) primary balance -4.8 -3.3 -2.9
8) Fiscal demand impact** -0.1 -1.7 -0.4
* A conditional path, based on the Convergence Programme submitted to the European Commission, which assumes an annual 0.5per cent GDP-
proportionate improvement in the ESA-based deficit in the years to come.
** Changes in the augmented SNA primary balance, corrected with changes in payments to private pension funds. Negative values denote con-
traction of fiscal demand.
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ESA-based deficit, identical to what is set in the
Government’s Convergence Programme submitted to
the European Commission in May. At the same time,
we also prepared the usual risk-based alternative sce-
nario showing that, due to the impact of already legis-
lated measures, the fiscal deficit would increase in
2005. We estimate that some 1.6 per cent in deficit-
reducing measures will be needed next year, in order to
achieve the 0.5 per cent (GDP-proportionate) reduction
of the deficit.
4. 3. 1 DETAILS OF THE FISCAL BALANCE 
EXPECTED FOR 2004
Our baseline projection for the general government
cash based (GFS) balance contains a slightly (0.1 per
cent of GDP) higher deficit relative to the May projec-
tion. The primary underlying reason for this shift is that,
in the case of certain autonomous expenditure items
(e.g. housing and pharmaceutical subsidies as well as
net interest expenses), we now expect higher expendi-
ture than was assumed when the previous Report was
prepared. Although there have only been minor
changes in our separate projections for these items,
they combine to add to the cash based (GFS) deficit.
At the level of the primary balance, our projection for the
sub-sector of the central budget reflects some deteriora-
tion in the balance, compared to the May projection.
On the revenue side, consistent with the changes in our
forecast for the macro-economy, we expect higher
income tax revenues (e.g. corporate tax, uniform busi-
ness tax and personal income tax); by contrast, in the
light of actual data on H1, and despite changes in our
macroeconomic forecast (e.g. higher consumption), we
expect lower revenues from consumption taxes (i.e.
VAT and excise duties). Overall, no significant changes
have occurred in our forecast for the total amount of
tax revenues to the central budget.
On the expenditure side, with respect to all expenditure
estimates under government control, similarly to the
practice we adopted in preparing our earlier projec-
tions, we accepted the current projection of the
Ministry of Finance. As there has been no change in our
approach, our projection for the expenditure included
in this category continues to be based on the MoF pro-
jection. Therefore, our projection for the annual net
expenditure of budgetary institutions and units is identi-
cal to that of the Ministry of Finance. At the same time,
we would like to point out that, based on actual data for
the first seven months of the year, risks of a higher
deficit seem to be on the upside in the case of these bal-
ance sheet items. We include this in the uncertainties
surrounding our projections (more information below.)
We assume full implementation of the measures aimed
at reducing expenditure which were announced in
March, with the majority of the measures taking effect
in 2004 H2. However, with regard to certain open-
ended expenditure items, our projection somewhat dif-
fers from what the MoF anticipates: on balance, relative
to our projection in May, we expect slightly higher actu-
al spending in the case of these items (i.e. expenditures
arising from housing and pharmaceutical subsidies).
Relative to our projection in May, the cash flow-based
interest balance has deteriorated somewhat (amounting
to less than 0.05 per cent of GDP), as we have revised
up our assumption for yields.
In compliance with our rule-based projections, in
preparing our central projection we consider the bal-
ance of the carry-overs from the previous year and
those carried forward to the next to be zero. In June
2004, the Government decided to impose restrictions
on the use of part of the carry-overs from last year to
this year (amounting to approximately HUF 105 billion).
Budgetary institutions and units must seek approval
from the Government in order to be able to utilise these
blocked carry-overs. This government measure leaves
our central projection unaffected, as in this case the
point is that the Government wished to reduce the risk
of net expenditure overruns arising from carry-overs.34
Relative to our projection in May, as regards the social
security sub-sector, we raised our projection for the
deficit of the social security funds, owing mainly to
changes to the pharmaceuticals subsidy scheme as of 1
July. Assuming unchanged consumer prices, raising the
producer prices of pharmaceuticals by 15 per cent to
their original level on 1 July will result in expenditure
overruns for the budget. We incorporated the full
amount of this extra expenditure into our projection for
the deficit of the social security sub-sector. Furthermore,
in accordance with the changes in our central projec-
tion for macroeconomic developments (i.e. higher
wage growth), we expect higher expenditure on old-age
pensions now than in May.
Our projection for the local government sub-sector has
remained unchanged relative to May, with the deficit
continuing to stand at close to 0.2 percentage points of
GDP.
Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding
methodology in the year of Hungary’s EU accession, we
34 The use of carry-overs from previous years adds to the deficit; by contrast, those left from the budget estimates of the year reviewed as they were not
fully used up, and carried forward to the following year reduce the central government deficit in the year reviewed. As an interim assessment of the
amount of unused expenditure estimates is difficult to provide, the Government, taking the interim use of expenditure estimates into consideration, aims
to control the use of net carry-overs, thereby restricting the potential development of a higher level of deficit.
61QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
4 SPECIAL TOPICS
4
prepared no comprehensive estimate for the accrual
basis correction of the difference between the GFS and
ESA deficit. Instead, as the level of the expected accru-
al basis correction, we accepted the amount arising
from the difference between the MoF projection for the
GFS deficit in 2004 and the ESA deficit as its target (1.2
per cent of GDP).35
In sum, with respect to the entire general government,
our central projection is for an ESA deficit that is 0.8 per-
centage points of GDP higher than the MoF forecast
published in July.36
As noted earlier, whereas we have revised up our deficit
forecast compared to our projection in May, mostly due
to changes in projections for the individual types of
expenditure, the fact remains that the fundamental
underlying reason for the differences between the MNB
projections and those of the MoF is the differences
between their respective forecasts for major tax rev-
enues (see the May Report).
4. 3. 2 UNCERTAINTY OF THE 2004 FORECAST
In this section we present all the risk factors which are
attributable to autonomous macroeconomic and fiscal
developments, but which our central projection cannot
allow for when we calculate the main scenario.
However, our risk assessment does not provide an
assessment of the measures aimed at the reduction of
expenditure that the Ministry of Finance may take in
H2. Moreover, we assume no change in monetary pol-
icy (more specifically, no change in the yield curve from
early August) for the whole of H2.
Relative to what was outlined in the previous issue, there
have been no major changes in the domain of the distri-
bution of risks. As is shown in the table below, in the
absence further measures aimed at improving the bal-
ance, the Government’s ESA-based deficit target for 2004
is unlikely to be met even under the best case scenario.
As regards the risks pointing to a lower level of deficit,
based on actual data on H1, it is still too early to pro-
vide an accurate forecast as to whether there will be a
reversal in the trends of the dynamics of VAT payments,
experienced in the past two years, and whether net VAT
payments will gradually return to a higher, closer-to-
trend level, as seen in earlier years. As the first four
months (i.e. the period preceding Hungary’s EU acces-
sion) failed to show any sign of either, in our judgement
such dynamics carries lower risks, compared to our risk
perception in May.
Since May, with regard to the risks of a lower deficit,
our baseline forecast for macroeconomic develop-
ments has shifted towards higher wage growth and
higher inflation. As their impact, which was quantified
among the downside risks to the deficit in May, has
been included in our central projection, we only allow
for the possibility of further risks of this direction to a
lesser extent.
Consistent with our growth expectations, which are
higher than previously forecast, higher-than-usual
advance payments of corporate tax may occur. No sim-
ilar kind of risks improving the balance was perceived at
the time of preparing the May Report.
Based on data for the first seven months, we consider
the risk implied in the one-off shortfall of VAT revenues,
35 The Ministry of Finance published its most recent projection for 2004 in July. It is for a cash flow-based government deficit of 5.8 per cent of GDP
(excluding the local government sub-sector), associated with a 4.6 per cent ESA deficit.
36 Within this, at the level of the central government, we assume a cash flow-based deficit of 6.4 per cent of GDP, which is 0.6 percentage point higher
than the MoF forecast based on an identical approach. Thus, our forecast associates a 5.2 to 5.3 per cent ESA deficit with the central government cat-
egory.
Factors of uncertainty in the GFS and ESA deficit projection for 2004
As a per cent of GDP
Table 4.5
Central projection of GFS deficit: -6.6 per cent
VAT shortfall of base period reverses 0.2 Larger-than-expected shortfall in VAT (EU accession) - 0.2
Delay in implementation of investment projects 0.2 Higher expenditure overruns incurred 
by institutions and local governments -0.5
Impact of macroeconomic developments 0.1 Higher-than-expected increase in some items 
Extra revenues in corporate tax 0.1 of open-end expenditure -0.1
GFS deficit under a best case scenario -6.0 GFS deficit under a worst case scenario -7.4
GFS – ESA bridge assumption +1.2
Potential correction of fixed investment on an accrual basis -0.1
ESA deficit under a best case scenario -4.8 ESA deficit under a worst case scenario -6.3
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due to Hungary’s EU accession and interpreted for the
purposes of our central projection, to be lower now
than earlier (0.2 per cent of GDP).
However, in our estimate, risks to a rise in expenditure,
attributable to certain fiscal developments, have
increased, representing 0.5 per cent of GDP. Relative to
our projection in May, there has also been an increase
in the risk of a higher deficit in the local government
sub-sector, along with expenditure overruns by budget-
ary institutions and units. The reason for this is that,
compared to last year, the balance of the sub-sector
deteriorated in the first five months of 2004.
In quantifying the risks, we did not allow for the risks rep-
resented by developments in the net balance of carry-
overs from previous years, since – as was pointed out
before – our central projection did not allow for the use
of the net carry-overs. Furthermore, a forecast for any
potential shift would run counter to the principle of
unchanged fiscal policy applied in this case as well.
4. 3. 3 FISCAL BALANCE EXPECTED FOR 2005 –
UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE FORECAST
As there is neither an approved budget for 2005 nor a
detailed draft bill of the budget, we prepared a norma-
tive and a risk-based forecast for 2005. The objective of
preparing a risk-based forecast is to provide an alterna-
tive scenario, based on existing determinations, which
shows the possible outturns for the general government
balance if no fiscal policy intervention (e.g. in the 2005
budget) occurs.37
The normative forecast constitutes the Report’s main
scenario, while the difference between the baseline and
the alternative scenario reflects the risks to reduction in
the deficit (0.5 per cent of GDP) along the targeted
path.
Our normative path is based on the assumption that in
2005 the level of the ESA-based deficit will improve by
an annual 0.5 per cent as a proportion of GDP, as set in
the Convergence Programme finalised in May.
The risk-based path, as earlier, continues to indicate a rising
deficit, owing to certain already legislated or officially
decided measures that either increase expenditure or
reduce revenues. Major determinations behind this include
the agreement concluded with the National Council for
Interest Reconciliation on the reduction of lump-sum
health contributions, resulting in a shortfall of tax revenues,
a shortfall of net customs revenues attributable to
Hungary’s EU accession, expenditure overruns attributable
to (delayed) disbursement of the 13th month’s wages in
the public sector, developments in the local government
investment cycle, based on historical data, and obligations
arising from Hungary’s NATO membership.
Thus, the difference between the assumed and the risk-
based fiscal scenario indicates that the planned 0.5 per
cent of GDP decline in the deficit in 2005 requires larg-
er, some 1.6 per cent in deficit-reducing measures.
37 For the preparation of a risk-based fiscal forecast, see Section 5.2 in the August 2003 issue of the Report.
Expected developments in fiscal indicators in 2005
As a per cent of GDP
Table 4.6
1 2 3 4 = 3 – 2
2004 2005
Deficit indicators Central Risk-based Central Risk
projection forecast projection
(assumption)
GFS deficit -6.6 -6.9 -5.3 1.6
ESA deficit -5.4 -6.5 -4.9 1.6
Augmented SNA deficit -7.1 -8.2 -6.6 1.6
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As regards developments in external balance, 2004 Q1
departed from what was expected in the previous
Report in many respects. Most importantly, the external
financing requirement of the corporate sector rose con-
siderably during this period, owing to brisk investment
activity. In May, we reasoned that with productivity on
the rise the external financing requirement of the corpo-
rate sector might well decline. However, we also antic-
ipated more moderate growth in investment, and it is
now clear that the corporate sector’s financing require-
ment is growing strongly, despite the increase in pro-
ductivity.
One major source of investment was imports, reflected
in a sharp rise in investment goods. As discussed in
Section 2.1.5 on goods trade, one-off factors also con-
tributed to a sharp increase in imports. In 2004, the
trade balance deficit will be significantly higher than
expected in May. Moreover, in the light of new, revised
CSO data, we attach a downside risk (i.e. toward a high-
er trade deficit) to our new deficit forecast for 2004.
Although the dynamics of corporate investment will
have tapered off somewhat by 2005, the sector’s bor-
rowing requirement (as a per cent of GDP) will
increase, even despite improved profitability.
As discussed in Section 2.1.3 on household consump-
tion, households’ financing capacity in 2004 Q1 already
suggested a marked improvement: the downward trend
in the savings rate stopped and credit expansion also
slumped owing to the tightening of the subsidised hous-
ing finance scheme affecting mortgage loans. The
extent of improvement exceeded what was expected in
May. As a consequence, households’ financing capaci-
ty in 2004 is likely to be substantially stronger than was
forecast in May even if household fixed investment con-
tinues to rise this year. In 2005, however, housing fixed
investment will decline significantly, and an even less
marked improvement in the net saving position will be
able to further boost the household sector’s financing
capacity.
The general government external financing requirement
failed to improve to the extent expected in May, owing
to a steep rise in investment in Q1. Moreover, notwith-
standing the announced measures to cut expenditure,
the nearly 1 per cent (relative to GDP) decrease in
financing requirement assumed in May is also unlikely
to occur in 2004. Nonetheless, there will be a slight
improvement, but any substantial drop in the general
government borrowing requirement along the currently
assumed fiscal path is only expected to materialise in
2005.
Thus, for reasons related to general government and the
private sector, the whole-economy external financing
requirement will be higher in 2004 than previously
expected, despite the improvement in households’ posi-
4. 4 DEVELOPMENTS IN EXTERNAL BALANCE
The current account and the financing position of the individual sectors
As a per cent of GDP
Table 4.7
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estimate Projection
I. General government* -5.0 -9.2 -8.4 -8.0 -6.7
II. Private sector (=1+2) -0.7 2.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3
1. Households 5.1 2.7 0.2 1.4 1.9
2. Firms -5.8 -0.3 -0.8 -1.8 -2.2
Financing requirement (I+II)** -5.6 -6.8 -9.0 -8.4 -7.0
Current account -6.3 -7.1 -8.9 -8.8 -8.0
EUR billions -3.6 -4.9 -6.5 -7.2 -7.0
* General government data reflect the cash-based deficit, which, although identical to the GFS deficit, also includes MNB and ÁPV Rt. profits and
quasi-fiscal expenditure.
** Financial and non-financial corporations combined. Motorway construction expenses are recorded in the general government entry.
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tion. As a result, the GDP-proportionate current
account deficit may reach 8.8 per cent, approximating
the level recorded in 2003. Due to a considerable drop
in the general government financing requirement and a
minor decrease in the private sector financing require-
ment, more marked improvement is expected to occur
in the external balance in 2005. The external financing
requirement and the current account deficit are likely to
improve by over 1.5 per cent and roughly 1 per cent,
respectively, as a proportion of GDP.
4. 4. 1 FINANCING THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
DEFICIT
In June 2004, consistent with international practice, the
MNB adopted a quarterly publication timetable with
respect to balance of payments statistics. Accordingly,
this year actual BOP data are available for the period
between January and April.
The current account deficit in the first four months of
2004 amounted to close to EUR 2.8 billion. The whole-
economy external borrowing requirement was identi-
cal, also standing at EUR 2.8 billion, with the capital
account balance being nearly neutral. While in 2003
the current account deficit was financed primarily by
borrowing abroad and non-residents’ purchases of
Hungarian government securities rather than by FDI
inflows, in early 2004 favourable changes occurred in
the structure of financing. FDI inflows, which plummet-
ed last year, have picked up this year. Simultaneously,
the share in the the private sector’s financing by foreign
debt has been on the decline.
Over the first four months of 2004, FDI inflows financed
31 per cent of the current account deficit, compared to
12 per cent coverage one year earlier and in 2003 as a
whole. In addition, portfolio inflows related to shares
and other shareholdings were also significant.38
Consequently, the proportion of non-debt financing
amounted to 37 per cent in the first four months in
2004, compared to a mere 20 per cent one year earlier.
Relative to last year’s high levels, the private sector’s net
borrowing abroad dropped markedly. In early Q2, how-
ever, net borrowing abroad started to rise again, due to
the banking system in particular. As resident banks’ bor-
rowing abroad increased, so did foreign currency lend-
ing to households and firms. In the first four months of
2004, private sector borrowing amounted to almost
EUR 1.7 billion, while that of general government con-
solidated with the MNB amounted to EUR 800 million,39
which is roughly identical to the structure of financing in
2003, in terms of proportions.
In 2004, owing to the anticipated increase in the corpo-
rate sector’s financing requirement and moderation in
that of general government, the currently high level of
FDI inflows (relative to last year) and the resultant non-
debt financing are expected to continue or rise slightly.
Furthermore, compared to the current level, the propor-
tion of financing the current account deficit through FX-
borrowing abroad is also likely to increase, which, how-
ever, is expected to be much lower than last year’s high
levels. As the scheduling of EU transfers is different than
anticipated, the capital account balance is expected to be
lower than assumed in the last Report. As a result, the
external financing requirement is expected to improve to
a lesser extent than was previously projected.
38 Owing, mainly, to the partial sale of the state shareholdings in MOL.
39 Following a steep rise in non-residents’ purchases of government securities in Q1, there was a significant drop in the portfolio in Q2.
Structure of current account financing
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External financing requirement
EUR millions
Table 4.8
2003 2003 2004 2004
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 FY Q1 April
1. External financing requirement -1593 -1788 -1406 -1777 -6564 -1762 -1018
1.1 Balance of the current account -1488 -1797 -1418 -1786 -6488 -1705 -1070
1.2 Balance of the capital account -105 9 12 9 -75 -57 52
2. Financing 4279 177 1604 1037 7096 1629 996
2.1 Direct investment -69 250 79 515 775 327 537
2.1.1 Abroad -472 -169 -37 -729 -1408 -252 -14
2.1.2 in Hungary 403 419 115 1244 2182 579 551
2.2 Consolidated government 1559 -289 1236 -271 2234 972 -183
2.2.1 MNB -116 -541 -771 -421 -1849 -736 -35
2.2.2 Government (without government securities) 947 -12 1146 280 2361 923 14
2.2.3 Foreigners’ purchases of government securities 728 264 861 -130 1722 785 -163
2.3 Private sector 2626 102 331 616 3676 134 643
2.3.1 Credit institutions 2647 -86 320 484 3365 246 327
2.3.2 Portfolio investment (equity) 212 38 147 -172 224 270 26
2.3.3 Corporate sector foreign borrowing -232 150 -136 304 87 -382 290
2.4 Net errors and omissions 163 114 -42 177 412 139 -2
3. Change in international reserves (1+2) 2686 -1611 198 -740 532 -133 -23
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Since the second half of 2003, the external recovery in
the global economy has had an increasingly strong
impact on Hungarian economic growth. In manufactur-
ing, however, labour demand has not followed this pick-
up in output, which in turn has triggered a salient
increase in productivity.40 Simultaneously with this,
wage inflation began to accelerate in manufacturing last
year, and in relation to the projections the question
arose: How long can the rapid increase in productivity
sustain corporate competitiveness when accompanied
by high rate of wage growth in the future? In other
words: Can we expect Hungarian productivity to keep
growing at the recent fast pace in the future?
Recent growth in productivity cannot be considered as
a unique feature of the Hungarian economy: this phe-
nomenon, termed in the literature as a ‘jobless recov-
ery’, was first observed in the USA at the beginning of
the 1990s. The current recovery is characterised by sim-
ilar features overseas and in Europe. It is no accident
that numerous papers have focussed on this subject in
the past few months.41 The overwhelming majority of
these studies conclude that the underlying reason for a
‘jobless recovery’ is the restructuring of production and,
consequently, a permanently high growth rate of pro-
ductivity can actually be expected in the long term.
The following analysis is a survey of productivity in
Hungary over the past 18 months. As productivity
tends to move in close correlation with the business
cycle, it is shaped by both structural and cyclical
effects. Accordingly, in the framework of an analysis of
aggregate time series, we first seek an answer to the
question as to what extent the manufacturing produc-
tivity growth of the past few quarters can be explained
by cyclical and structural effects. In the second part of
the analysis, productivity growth is broken down in
both a growth accounting and a shift share framework,
and the role of structural shifts, capital deepening and
technological progress is examined.
The results of our time series analysis indicate that cycli-
cal effects give an essentially sound explanation for the
variations in productivity. However, that part of our
analysis which focussed on the components of growth
also identified structural factors: the substitution of
labour by capital and the decline in the textile industry
both contributed to the pick-up in productivity. But the
factor that played the greatest role in rapid growth was
technological progress, most probably related to the
fast development of information and communication
technology (ICT) in Hungary. Over the long run, howev-
er, these structural effects are expected to weaken. On
the whole, we conclude that over the long term such a
high rate of productivity growth cannot be maintained,
and that a slowdown is likely in the future.
4. 5. 1 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE BUSINESS
CYCLE EXPLAIN GROWTH IN PRODUCTIVITY?
Theoretical considerations and domestic experience
suggest that productivity moves pro-cyclically: in times
of recovery it accelerates, whereas during a recession it
slows. As a first step, we seek an answer to the question
what productivity growth would result from the cyclical
fluctuations of production and labour input in the cur-
rent stage of recovery, if the relationship observed in
the past were taken as a basis. If the estimated produc-
tivity growth numbers roughly correspond to the actual
data, then, in our opinion, the trends of the past period
result from cyclical effects, and if they are smaller, struc-
tural effects may have also affected them.
The production/labour-input relationship is estimated
by a regression between labour input and the output
gap in the period between 1995 Q1 and 2002 Q4.42
4. 5 HOW ROBUST IS THE RECENT RAPID RISE IN MANUFACTURING
PRODUCTIVITY?
40 In this analysis, productivity is interpreted as a ratio of added value to total hours worked, which is justified by several reasons. Division by the num-
ber of total hours worked allows for a direct analysis of the relationship between the unit of labour input and production. As the productivity indicator is
used for the most part to analyse competitiveness, value added is seen as a more appropriate indicator than gross output, as the latter also contains
materials input.
41 On the USA, see Groschen, E. and Potter S. (2003) ‘Has Structural Change Contributed to a Jobless Recovery?’, Current Issues in Economics and
Finance, Vol. 9., No. 8.; on the EU see the European Commission’s Quarterly Report for 2003 Q4, and Sweden is analysed in the 2004 Q1 Inflation
Report of the Sveriges Riksbank.
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Then, with the help of the estimated parameters we
make a projection for the period 2003 Q1–2004 Q1,
and then establish the difference between the project-
ed and the actually measured labour input. Our calcu-
lations show that, although residuals were in the nega-
tive domain in the past two quarters (indicating that
labour input remained lower than justified by the cur-
rent stage of the business cycle), on the basis of past
behaviour, the discrepancy cannot be considered as
either systematic or abnormally large.43 Thus, the
growth rate of productivity can be adequately
explained by cyclical fluctuations. In the following, we
continue with a more disaggregated analysis and focus
on the various components of productivity growth.
Capital deepening, structural shifts and technological
progress
As indicated in earlier issues of the Report, the rela-
tive rise in labour costs during 2001–2002 is
assumed to have prompted companies to substitute
labour with capital, which perhaps contributed to the
rapid growth of productivity. Decomposition of pro-
ductivity growth by factors of production indicates
that capital deepening had an increasing part in
explaining the rise in productivity in the recent peri-
od.
Earlier issues of the Report also explained that the
decline in manufacturing labour demand, commencing
from end-2004, was due in most part to the downturn
in a single industry, namely textile manufacturing. The
questions that arise are: (i) to what extent is the rise in
capital intensity in manufacturing attributable to the so-
called structural shift effect (e.g. to the decline in the
highly labour-intensive textile industry); and (ii) whether
the decline in the textile industry increased capital inten-
sity, and thus productivity, in manufacturing permanent-
ly?
The outcome of our analysis suggest that structural
shifts played a major role in the recent growth in manu-
facturing productivity.44 In 2001 and 2003, labour-inten-
sive sectors lost significance, promoting growth in pro-
ductivity. This is partly related to the textile industry
decline. But despite a major decline in that branch,
labour-intensive sectors increased their share in employ-
ment in 2002, as a result of growth in the food industry,
and the manufacture of rubber and metals. Growth in
labour-intensive sectors other than the textile industry
suggests that the collapse of this industry alone does
not necessarily entail a permanent decline in overall
manufacturing labour intensity. Moreover, the structur-
al shift effect is far smaller in the EU Member States than
in Hungary and is decreasing, while in the USA it has a
negative value.45
Based on this, over the long run the sectoral composi-
tion effect is assumed to diminish and finally to disap-
Difference between estimated and actual labour
input, 1995 Q1–2004 Q1
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Broken line: double the standard error of regression in both direc-
tions.
42 We estimated this relationship, cited in economics as Okun’s law, in the following form: yt=c+xt+yt–1+xt–1+εt, where yt is the logarithm of the labour
input gap and xt is the logarithm of the output gap. Gaps were calculated using an HP filter. Due to the endogenous nature of the explanatory variable
xt, the equation was estimated by Two-Stage Least Square method.
43 The significance of the difference is approximated by double the standard equation error.
44 If manufacturing productivity is defined as a sum of the employment weights of productivity in the individual sub-sectors, then total productivity growth
can be divided into two constituents. On the one hand, sector productivity variations cumulated by invariable employment weights give a value for the
intra-industry change in labour intensity. On the other, weighting of changes in the employment rates with productivity weights gives a value for the
impact of structural shifts.
45 See Focus on ‘Slow productivity growth in the euro area: causes and possible remedies’ in: Quarterly Report of the Commission of the EU, 2003 Q4.
Source: own calculations.
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pear. This means that even the effects resulting from
structural shifts cannot maintain a high rate of produc-
tivity growth over the longer term.
Our calculations indicate that the rise in labour pro-
ductivity in recent quarters has been due to strong
TFP growth rather than capital deepening. Currently,
the academic literature identifies technological
progress predominantly with the spill-over of ICT.
Information on the ICT sector’s role in Hungary during
the past six quarters, particularly relevant for this analy-
sis, is scarce. Based on the international literature,46 it
may be established that, due to the relocation of com-
puter manufacturing to Hungary, the significance of the
ICT sector is relatively high in a regional comparison
and, on the average of the period between 1995 and
2001, the ICT sector’s contribution to productivity
growth exceeded the corresponding data of the CEE
countries and the EU. However, the so-called spill-over
effect, a pivotal factor in the long-term sustainability of
the current rate of productivity growth, is not apparent
in the Hungarian data. Although the ICT sector’s contri-
bution to productivity growth and quantification of the
spill-over effect require further analysis, the recent rise
in productivity seems to be unsustainable on the basis
of the current state of technological progress.
Decomposition of manufacturing productivity
growth (Shift share analysis), 1999–2003
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46 Van Ark, B. and Piatkowski, M. (2004), ‘Productivity, Innovation and ICT in Old and New Europe’, GGDC Research Memorandum GD-69. and
Piatkowski, M. (2004) ‘The Aggregate Contribution of ICT to Output and Labour Productivity Growth in Transition Economies’, paper prepared for the
TIGER Conference ‘ICT as Drivers of Development in Transition Economies’ held in Warsaw, 14 May 2004.
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In the past, first quarter outturns for certain significant
real economic indicators have often revealed more
robust improvements in the underlying processes than
the forecasts in the Report. ‘Calendar effects’ were
thought to be the main reason behind these phenome-
na since they are eliminated from the seasonally adjust-
ed time series serving as the basis of our forecast.
Consequently, if these effects are considerable within a
year, the growth rates derived from the original data will
differ from those derived from the seasonally adjusted
time series. Having examined the calendar effects in
more detail, we also found that in certain important real
economic variables (most markedly in the time series
for GDP and industrial output) these effects were signif-
icant from a statistical point of view, and that a part of
the high increase in these time series, exceeding our
implicit forecast for the first quarter in the Report, can
be attributed to calendar effects (for example, an extra
day due to the leap year). Another interesting finding is
that, at the same time, no calendar effect can be seen
in the items on the expenditure side of GDP at the
approved statistical significance levels. As the time
series analysed go back only for a relatively short peri-
od, the estimated and quantified value of calendar
effects should be treated with caution.
4. 6. 1 CALENDAR EFFECTS IN BRIEF
In analysing or forecasting real economic developments,
seasonally adjusted time series are used. Under our adjust-
ment method (TRAMO/SEATS), which is also officially rec-
ommended by Eurostat, the various time series compo-
nents (trend, cycle, seasonal) are decomposed not on an
ad hoc, but on a model basis.47 This type of decomposi-
tion can only be adequate if ‘extraordinary’ effects (such
as outliers, calendar effects, identifiable one-off effects and
effects caused by possible lack of data) are eliminated
from the time series by pre-adjustment. Thus, these effects
are not included in the seasonally adjusted data or the
time series used in a number of our analyses.
In respect of time series, we talk of calendar effects
when the number of working days or the time span are
different in subsequent (or compared) periods, or when
public holidays resulting in certain increased activity fall
in different calendar periods.
In the first case, a calendar period of a given year (a
month or a quarter) can contain even two or three
working days more (or less) than the previous period or
the same period a year earlier, due to the difference
caused in turn by variations in weekend days or fixed
public holidays in the yearly calendar. Here, a possible
higher increase due to extra working days will not
reflect the actual direction of developments: this is the
reason why this effect is eliminated in preparing our
forecasts. This is the first type of calendar effects: the
working-day effect.48
An extra day appears in the appropriate period of leap
years (in February in the case of data of monthly fre-
quency and in the first quarter in the case of quarterly
frequency), also resulting in a calendar effect. Due to its
periodic occurrence, this effect can be distinguished
from the working-day effect, and so a separate leap-year
effect can be described.
In order to see that two different effects are at work, it
is worth comparing a plant (for example, a power sta-
tion) practically operating permanently and another one
closed on all weekends and public holidays (for exam-
ple, a cloth manufacturer). In the case of the power sta-
tion, there is no working-day effect, while the leap-year
effect (one extra calendar day) is reflected. In the case
of the cloth manufacturer, however, a strong working-
day effect is likely to be detected, while the leap-year
effect may be insignificant. In reality, there are a great
number of both types of plants, but we have reliable
methods at our disposal to separate working-day effects
from leap-year effects even at higher levels of aggregat-
ed data.
4. 6 CALENDAR EFFECTS IN ECONOMIC TIME SERIES
47 The program can be downloaded from the EUROSTAT’s homepage on seasonal adjustment.
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/dsis/eurosam/library?l=/software/demetra_software&vm=detailed&sb=Title
48 In longer time series of higher (monthly) frequency a change in the number of the different days of the week (Monday, Tuesday …) can also lead to
calendar effects. These are called ‘trading-day effects’.
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The third type of calendar effects is related to moving
holidays. In Hungary, these include Easter and
Pentecost. These official holidays may occur in different
months in different years and Easter may even occur in
a different quarter. This may upset the otherwise normal
seasonality of the time series and, as a result, this type
of calendar effect must also be dealt with before
decomposing the actual seasonal component. As
increased activity has an effect on more than one day
before Easter Sunday, we used the Easter effect,49 a spe-
cial correction factor in our seasonal adjustment
method.
If a time series is affected by any type of calendar
effects, there will be a difference between the growth
rates derived from the unadjusted time series and the
seasonally adjusted time series from which calendar
effects have previously been removed. Therefore, in our
analysis we search for calendar effects in those real eco-
nomic variables for which we publish forecasts in the
Report and in indicators of major relevance to our infla-
tion forecasts. Where these effects were clearly demon-
strable, we analysed them from the point of view of our
forecasts for 2004, with the aim of quantifying the direc-
tion and the size of their possible deviation from the fig-
ures given in May.
4. 6. 2 THE TOPICALITY OF CALENDAR EFFECTS
Calendar effects have gained importance recently, as in
2004 many more public holidays fall on weekends than
the multi-year average and, as a result, the number of
working days is higher than the multi-year average and
the number of working days in 2003. In addition, 2004
is also a leap year and as such, both working-day and
leap-year effects are reflected in the 2004 figures of cer-
tain real economic indicators. As explained above, it is
not advisable to merge the two effects into one.
As we have found calendar effects in the outturns for
certain important time series for 2004 Q1, discussed in
the Report, it may be worth considering whether our
present forecasting practice should be continued. At
the moment, only seasonally adjusted time series are
analysed and included in the forecast, neglecting the
fact that growth rates based on unadjusted data deviate
(or may deviate) from those calculated explicitly or
implicitly. This approach will most likely not be contin-
ued, as our forecasts of seasonally adjusted time series
would have to be corrected on the basis of the estimat-
ed calendar effects.
As an illustration, the analyses by the ECB and the
Deutsche Bundesbank are available.50 In the June 2004
issue of its Monthly Bulletin, the ECB examined calen-
dar effects in the GDP time series of six countries:
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and
Spain. As regards the 2004 average annual GDP growth
rate, the strongest effect was estimated in Germany
(+0.5 percentage points), a relatively strong effect was
estimated in the case of France (+0.2–0.3 percentage
points), while there was no considerable effect in the
other countries. In addition to GDP time series, the
Deutsche Bundesbank analysed calendar effects for the
aggregates of the time series for the production and
expenditure sides as well. A rather strong, 0.6-percent-
age point calendar effect was estimated for GDP itself:
an economic growth rate of 1.2 per cent was calculat-
ed eliminating the calendar effects, and a 1.8 per cent
increase was estimated including them.
4. 6. 3 QUANTIFYING CALENDAR EFFECTS
The method we use for seasonal adjustment
(TRAMO/SEATS51) eliminates calendar effects from the
time series under review even before decomposing
them. The quality of pre-adjustment also determines the
quality of the decomposition of the time series and,
consequently, in parallel with our present analysis, we
examined whether or not the Hungarian calendar sett-
ings of the adjustment programme, defined back in
1999, were adequate.52
The estimates of calendar effects are illustrated on the
constant price GDP time series, while the calendar
effects found in other time series are shown in a sum-
mary table (Table 2). Based on the adjustment of the
GDP time series data from 1995 Q1 to 2004 Q1, cur-
rently viewed as producing the best results, only the
leap-year effect out of all the calendar effects has a sig-
nificant explanatory power (i.e. at the most acceptable
5 per cent level). Therefore, no significant working-day
or Easter effect can be demonstrated in the time series,
and no other pre-adjustments are needed apart from
those required by calendar effects.
49 In principle, such effect can also be felt before Christmas, but as Christmas is a fixed holiday, the effect can always be felt in December, i.e. in the
fourth quarter and as such can be treated as part of normal seasonality.
50 In addition, based on verbal consultation, we are also aware that the OECD also tried to quantify calendar effects as it considered them important, but
estimated the extent of these effects as relatively low.
51 In addition, Demetra also offers the X12-ARIMA method as a possibility for adjustment. Unless we have a strong argument against it, in the case of
‘flow’ time series the TRAMO/SEATS method should be used as it also takes into account country-specific bank holidays (e.g. 15 March in Hungary). In
the case of ’stock’ time series, however, the X12-ARIMA has better built-in possibilities, although at present we do not often work with ‘stock’ time series.
52 Having reviewed the built-in country-specific holiday block of TRAMO/SEATS, we noticed that the Hungarian ‘set’ did not contain 1 November, a day
that has been a bank holiday since 2000: a fact in itself justifying the readjustment of the main time series. In addition, we also decided to treat 24
December as a bank holiday in the adjustment programme since on 24 December and 31 December, officially announced as working days, economic
activity is much lower than normal and this must also be taken into account when making corrections. As these two dates always fall on the same day
of the week, this decision did not result in additional complications.
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Accordingly, by comparing the GDP time series after
eliminating the calendar effects with the unadjusted
series, we derive the leap-year effect.53 Due to the cal-
endar nature of the leap year, its effect is rather easy to
follow: we can only see a significant deviation in the
first quarter of the calendar years divisible by four and
in the first quarter of the subsequent year (here with an
opposite sign; see Chart 2).
The above differences also suggest that a significant
deviation in average annual GDP growth rates can only
be detected in the leap year and the subsequent year,
and that these deviations will also be of the opposite
sign. These differences, however, were not significant
when expressed in percentage points.
Thus, while there were significant differences between
the annual growth rates for the first quarters of leap
years and the subsequent years (in the case of the most
up-to-date data for 2004 Q1, the 4.2 per cent growth
rate calculated from the original data published by the
CSO is in contrast with a growth rate of only 3.6 per
cent derived from the time series adjusted for calendar
effects), on a yearly level the most significant deviation
was merely 0.2 percentage points in 2001. Accordingly,
despite the great difference in the first quarter, we
should not presume that a difference higher than 0.2
percentage points can be expected between our fore-
cast for the annual growth rate based on seasonally
adjusted time series after eliminating the calendar
effects and the annual growth rate calculated from the
original GDP time series including calendar effects.
It should be noted, however, that the time series avail-
able for adjustment is not too long (containing only
three leap years) and the two preceding leap years
(1996 and 2000) had significantly fewer working days
than 2004. It is possible, therefore, that the working-day
effect is not too robust due to the short time series.
Consequently, in 2004 we have included a somewhat
higher deviation in our calculations for the benefit of
the growth rates derived from the original time series
than the estimated average leap-year effect.
Our findings related to calendar effects, based on a sim-
ilar analysis of other real economy macro variables, are
summarised in Table 2. It shows that, apart from the
time series for GDP and industrial production, practical-
ly no other time series contain calendar effects. This
should be treated with some reservation as, in addition
to the offsetting factors or the relatively short time series
discussed above, we suspect that certain time series of
lower aggregation are not properly published, due to
problems related to data collection or to the statistical
reporting system, or that these time series are corrected
before publication in a way blunting or totally eliminat-
ing calendar effects. A similar suspicion related to the
publication of Hungarian data has been raised before at
international level.
Consequently, the interpretation and discussion of cal-
endar effects detected in certain Hungarian real eco-
nomic time series should be treated with increased cau-
tion.
53 Additional smaller differences indicate non-significant working-day effects. As mentioned above, a single leap-year correction cannot be expected and
thus these will be pre-adjusted in every case whether they are significant or not.
Deviation between the GDP time series adjusted
for calendar effects and the original GDP time
series
Quarter-on-quarter growth rates
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Table 4.9
Year-on-year growth rate for Q1 Annual average growth rate
Original Corrected Difference* Original Corrected Difference*
1996 0.59 0.11 0.48 1.32 1.20 0.12
1997 2.31 3.01 -0.70 4.57 4.71 -0.14
2000 6.56 5.73 0.83 5.20 5.15 0.05
2001 4.17 4.88 -0.71 3.85 4.04 -0.19
2004 4.24 3.63 0.60
* Percentage points.
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Calendar effects in certain significant real economy time series
Table 4.10
* Changes in percentage points attributable only to calendar effects.
** The value at 5 per cent significance level is in brackets.
*** The time series is not homogenous, it is made up by chaining time series separately adjusted on partial samples.
Sample period Trading day Leap year Easter effect
effect effect
GDP 1995 Q1–2004 Q1 - + -
- parameter 0.0003 0.0065
- t-value** 1.17 (2.02) 2.42 (2.02)
Industrial output 1992 Q1–2004 Q1 - + -
- parameter 0.0005 0.0082
- t-value** 1.20 (2.01) 2.79 (2.01)
Manufacturing output 1992 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
Manufacturing value added 1995 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
Market services value added 1995 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
Household consumption 1991 Q1–2004 Q1*** - - -
Private sector wages 1993 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
Corporate investment 1995 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
Goods export 1995 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
Goods import 1995 Q1–2004 Q1 - - -
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The cyclically adjusted budget deficit (CAB) is an indica-
tor of the fiscal position assessed by a wide array of
European institutions, including the European
Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB).
The key concept behind CAB is to eliminate the tran-
sient effects of economic cycles from the underlying
budget balance and identify actual, discretionary fiscal
expansion or restriction.
The first step in eliminating the cyclical effects is to iden-
tify the potential level or long-term trend of the various
economic variables. There are two fundamentally differ-
ent approaches in the international literature to identify
the potential level of variables and thus the CAB. For
example, the EC directly calculates the effects of eco-
nomic cycles on the fiscal budget using the aggregate
output gap derived from GDP, that is, the cyclical posi-
tion of the economy is expressed by a 
single real economic cyclical indicator.54 Accordingly,
the underlying assumption behind this procedure is that
the individual components of GDP are in the same
cyclical position as the aggregate output gap.
As, at any given moment, the various aggregates of
GDP are not necessarily in the same cyclical position
and they may have different effects on the budget bal-
ance, the ECB uses a disaggregated approach which
means evaluating the various aggregates of GDP sepa-
rately.55 However, the disaggregated approach is based
on examining the various aggregates independently
rather than on decomposing the aggregate output gap.
The ECB uses a single-variable method (the so-called HP
filter) to define trend values, for the sake of easy repro-
duction.
In a recent Working Paper,56 we have amalgamated the
advantages of the two approaches discussed above to
develop a model, using the output gap derived from the
production function according to the EC’s methodolo-
gy, which, however, decomposes the aggregate output
gap into the relevant GDP components using econom-
ics relationship. Due to the disaggregated nature of the
method, its results are close to those produced by the
ECB’s approach.
The cyclically adjusted general government balance
(CAB) can be derived by deducting the estimated cycli-
cal component from the headline (GFS or other) deficit
as a percentage of GDP. If the cyclical component is
negative, the cyclically adjusted deficit is smaller than
the headline deficit, and vice versa, in the case of a pos-
itive cyclical component, the cyclically adjusted deficit
is higher than the not adjusted, headline deficit.
The major difference between the aggregated and the
disaggregated methods can be best captured in
2002–2003 data. Due to the negative aggregate output
gap resulting from lower-than-previous GDP growth,
the EC’s approach indicates a negative cyclical compo-
nent, meaning that, after eliminating the cyclical effects,
the deficit is smaller than the headline deficit (see the
negative values of the cyclical component in column
‘EC’ of the Table). However, in the ECB’s and our own
research approach (CMHP) wages and consumption
were above their potential levels, due to the significant
increases in real wages and consumption, which are the
dominant factors of fiscal revenue, meaning that the
cyclically adjusted deficit was higher than the actual.
Another interesting finding of our paper is that, due to
the different inflation of the various components of
GDP, price shocks may counterbalance the cyclical
position of the real variables. Accordingly, the cyclical
component after and before eliminating the price
shocks may have different signs. This was the case in
1995–1996, when the widening gap between the con-
sumer price index and the GDP deflator partly offset the
cyclical impact of real variables deteriorating the fiscal
position and, moreover, its overall impact was an
improvement in the fiscal balance according to certain
approaches.
4. 7 THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CYCLES ON THE GENERAL
GOVERNMENT BALANCE
54 Denis, C., M. K, and Röger, W (2002) ‘Production Function Approach to Calculating Potential Growth and Output Gaps – Estimates for the EU Member
States and the US’ European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Papers No. 176, September 2002.
55 Bouthevillain, C., Cour-Thimann, P., van den Dool, G., P. H. Cos, Langenus, G., Mohr, M., Momigliano, S. and Tujula, M. (2001) ‘Cyclically Adjusted
Budget Balances: An Alternative Approach’ European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 77, September 2001.
56 Gábor, Kiss and Gábor, Vadas: ‘Mind the gap – Watch the ways of cyclical adjustment of the budget balance’, MNB Working Paper No. 7/2004, Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, http://www.mnb.hu.
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Contribution of the cycle to general government balance under various calculation methods*
Table 4.11
Cyclical component Cyclical component including price effects
EC ECB CMHP EC ECB CMHP
1995 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.7
1996 -0.4 -1.0 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.1
1997 0.1 -0.9 -0.3 0.1 -0.9 -0.3
1998 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.7 0 0.4
1999 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3
2000 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2
2001 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0
2002 0.1 0.5 0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.2
2003 -0.2 0.8 0.4 -0.4 0.6 0.2
* As a per cent of GDP. Positive (negative) values indicate that the business cycle reduced (increased) the general government deficit on its own.
The cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) can be derived by subtracting the cyclical component from the headline general government bal-
ance (GFS or, for example, ESA based).
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Increasing oil prices have directed the attention of
many macroeconomic analysts towards the expected
economic effects and potential risks. Since the develop-
ment of oil prices may have a considerable effect on
both the world economy and the Hungarian economy,
in this analysis we attempt to summarise the expected
effects, expressing them in figures as well. Before show-
ing the results of the simulations we find it important to
present a historical overview of crude oil prices and the
characteristics of Hungarian economy – relevant from
the point of view of the effects expressed in actual fig-
ures.
4. 8. 1 HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL CRUDE
OIL PRICES
As mentioned in the summary, global crude oil prices
have not been as high as the June or July level since the
oil crisis of 1979–80. At the same time, should we wish
to summarise the relevant economic effects we have to
consider the price changes of other products and serv-
ices as well. On the basis of the so-called real price
level, filtering out inflationary effects, it is clear that in
real terms current oil prices are far lower than prices at
the time of the 1979–80 and the 1973–74 crises.
The effect of oil prices on Hungarian economy can only
be estimated by considering the development of the
USD/EUR – or parallel, the HUF/EUR – exchange rate.
Although the trend of oil price increase expressed in
dollars already started in May 2003, until February of
this year the strengthening of the euro to a similar
extent fully compensated for this upward price trend.
Therefore, in the euro area and the closely integrated
economies – such as Hungary – the increase of oil
prices has only become strongly perceptible since the
beginning of this year. Disregarding some periods of
weakening of the forint against the euro (June–August
2003), oil prices expressed in forints essentially showed
a similar behaviour as the euro-denominated prices.
4. 8. 2 THE MAIN FACTORS BEHIND HIGH OIL
PRICES
The development of the current level of oil prices is the
joint effect of several price-boosting factors taking place
almost simultaneously.
4. 8 THE EFFECT OF GLOBAL CRUDE OIL MARKET PRICES ON THE
HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
Real and nominal oil prices 
Deflated by the US consumer price index; at 1995 price levels
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Last year, the world economy appeared to rebound
from the trough in the economic cycle, which – apart
from the economic upswing – is also mirrored in the
increasing demand for oil. A particularly quick rise took
place in China and in the other South East Asian coun-
tries. Owing to a sustained economic increase we may
expect to see even greater demand for crude oil.
On the demand side, the limited nature of current capac-
ities did not allow the demand to be satisfied without a
price increase. The global crude oil production is cur-
rently at 80-85 million (corr. 17.08.2005., editor) barrels
per day, and to the best of our knowledge this quantity
cannot be further increased to a considerable extent
over the short run. The members of OPEC,57 consisting
of the most significant oil-producing countries,  are
already producing over their quota and they do not have
any further significant production capacities (apart from
Saudi Arabia). The non-OPEC states are in a similar posi-
tion. The low supply is generally due to the non-occur-
rence of capacity increasing investment, which is further
exacerbated by production stoppages due to the danger
of war.
In the past few months the insecurities relating to the oil
prices were heightened by the war (Iraq) and the tense
domestic political situations (Nigeria, Venezuela,
Russia) in several large oil producing countries.
As seen from our brief list, the current increase in oil
prices cannot be tied to just one economic or political
event. The price increase is a result of shocks in the sup-
ply and demand, jointly with psychological factors (due
to the risk of war).
4. 8. 3 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MAIN
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HIGH OIL PRICES
On the basis of the experiences of past decades a last-
ing increase in oil prices leads to a slackening GDP
growth rate in the developed economies. This is partly
the result of real economic processes and partly of the
economic policy measures taken as a reaction.
Changes in oil prices primarily have an effect on the real
economy via a decline in global demand. The increase
of oil prices results in a redistribution of revenues from
oil importing countries to oil exporting countries. As the
crude oil exporting countries (primarily less developed
countries) have a lower demand and are less import-
intensive than the crude oil importing countries (mainly
developed economies), through this redistribution of
revenues aggregate demand decreases as well, worsen-
ing the prospects for external recovery for these
economies.
Increasing oil prices result in a worsening terms of trade
for the importing countries, which also decreases the
real and financial assets of the economic participants in
the given countries. As a result of the so-called ‘asset-
effect’, the aggregate demand of the economy may also
decrease.
A similar effect occurs if wages – as a consequence of
the inflexible approach of the labour market – do not
react over the short run to increasing inflation stemming
from higher oil prices, thereby decreasing aggregate
demand.
The macroeconomic effect of oil prices is greatly influ-
enced by economic policy reactions. On the basis of the
experiences of the oil crisis in the 1970s, the only way to
prevent a lasting price increase from increasing the infla-
tionary expectations of the economic participants is to
maintain strict monetary conditions (via fiscal policy).
The extent of the impact on the real economy greatly
depends on the sensitivity of a given economy to oil
import and the energy intensity of production. As
Hungary does not have any large exploitable oil
reserves and the energy intensity of production is signif-
icantly higher than in more developed European coun-
tries, the real economic effects presumably have a
greater influence on Hungary than on the countries
with the above described characteristics.
Inflationary effects
The effect of oil prices on consumer prices largely
depends on the duration of the effect of oil market
57 On the basis of the 2004 figures this organisation accounts for 41 per cent of global crude oil production.
Energy intensity of certain economies
Energy consumption needed for producing one dollar’s worth
of GDP on the basis of 2001 data
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prices. A relatively narrow range of consumer basket
components (fuels) immediately react to oil price move-
ments on the world market. Within this product catego-
ry the oil price movement is characteristically symmetri-
cal. Contrary to this, in the case of most consumer goods
only lasting oil price changes have an inflationary effect.
In respect of these products or services, the price
change is the result of a longer ‘carry-over’ period, which
– taking the strict pricing behaviour into consideration –
results in a characteristically asymmetric adaptation of
prices. The inflationary effect of increasing oil prices – be
it lasting or transitory – is particularly dangerous and can
hardly be combated by economic policy instruments if
the price increase involves an increase of inflationary
expectations as well.
In the following, we attempt to map the main channels
through which global oil prices may influence inflation-
ary developments in a small, open economy. We have
tried to provide a list of the factors in line with the time
that the inflationary effect appears.
Cost-side factors (in the order of the appearance of
price effects)
The change of oil prices denominated in the domestic
currency directly and practically immediately modifies
fuel prices which represent a considerable component
of the total consumer basket. At the same time, as the
price of petrol is subject to significant taxes and other
administrative fees in most developed economies,
changes in producer prices appear in quite a subdued
way in consumer prices.
Most energy prices (including fuels, marked-to-market
energy items and those with regulated prices) move in
close conjunction with global oil prices, either as a
result of cost-side effects or as a result of the develop-
ment of pricing formulae or price regulatory decisions
(gas prices).
In the industrial sectors using fuels or crude oil products
(e.g. transportation and chemicals industry) increases in
oil prices appear relatively quickly as a cost-push pres-
sure after any existing reserve stocks have been
exhausted.
If high oil prices are sustained for a longer period of
time, due to the effect of price increases of the above-
mentioned ‘mediating sector’, inflation becomes felt in
practically all components of core inflation and beyond
this scope as well (e.g. regulated non-energy prices).
Demand factors
The increase of inflation may be moderated by the fact
that a lasting increase in oil prices decreases the extent
of output gap characteristic of the given economy by
retarding the economic growth, which eases the infla-
tionary pressure on the economy.
Effect on expectations of market participants
A sustained increase in oil prices may modify the infla-
tion perceptions and expectations of key economic par-
ticipants, which worsens the inflation outlook of the
given economy over the long run via price and wage
agreements (increase in real wages independently of
production). The impact of this factor depends on the
economy’s degree of labour capacity utilisation, the
capacity of employees to protect their interests and the
history of inflation in the given country.
4. 8. 4 SIMULATION RESULTS
The effect of a sustained oil price increase on inflation
and on the real economy was simulated by preparing
an alternative oil price path, higher than assumed in the
basic scenario. The resulting oil price path assumes a 10
per cent higher price level than the futures prices at the
end of 2004 Q2. In the simulation we used a constant
dollar/euro and forint/euro rate, and did not assume a
change in the economic policy environment. Clearly,
both the central bank and the Government can imme-
diately exercise a significant effect on the above-men-
tioned inflationary and real economic processes
through direct or indirect economic policy instruments.
The estimates do not calculate the effects arising from
Overview of the main inflationary effects of oil prices
Table 4.12
increasing fuel and
energy prices
Direct effects
the rising of transportation 
and commodity prices 
effect practically all 
components of core inflation
Indirect effects
Cost-side factors
both outside and inside factors
moderate the size of 
"output gap" in the whole 
economy
Demand effects
accelerating in inflation process
can cause increasing in
wage and price expectations of
market participants
Inflation expectations Fiscal and monetary 
policy reactions
Inflationary effects
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changes in inflation expectations (since our current
models only apply so-called ‘retroactive’ methods).
The simulations were carried out with the help of a
global model of the world economy (NIGEM58) and a
simultaneous macroeconomic model developed for the
Hungarian economy (NEM59). The results are sum-
marised in the following table.
Effect on GDP
Higher crude oil prices hardly lead to a decrease in the
current GDP growth rate, but do decrease the 2005
data more significantly. In particular, the slower increase
in external demand has an effect on Hungarian eco-
nomic output. The gradual slackening of internal
demand – compared to the projections of the basic
path – appears parallel to the slackening dynamics of
external demand. This is partly the result of the decreas-
ing profitability of export-producing companies, and
partly the result of the effects on private revenues (e.g.
effect on assets). We estimated that the retarding
effects of higher oil prices are most strongly felt in the
middle of the following year and with the establishment
of new revenue-producing and production structures
they are gradually priced out.
Inflationary effects
At first, increasing oil prices influence consumer infla-
tion through their direct impact. The increase in the
price of raw material is immediately realised in fuel
prices. However, since in Hungary various taxes and
tax-like burdens amount to almost two-thirds of the
petrol price, the change of producer prices does not
result in a similar change in the total price and – due to
the fact that other production costs do not change
immediately – producer prices are not increased to an
extent fully equalling the oil price increase. With a delay
of a few quarters the changes in the global oil prices
may directly influence certain energy prices as well (e.g.
the global price of diesel oil explicitly appears in the gas
price formula, though with a due delay), because their
production is mostly based on crude oil.
According to our calculations these direct effects are
dominant in the consumer prices in 2004, as a result of
which the value of the total consumer price index
increases by an annual average of 0.1 percentage point
and by approximately 0.2 percentage points at year
end. After an approximately six month transition, the
direct – mostly cost-side – effects of the shock come to
bear as well, as a consequence of which in the first
quarter of 2005 the consumer price inflation may
exceed the value projected in the basic scenario by 0.4
percentage points. As the high oil prices come into the
base data, the impact of inflation becomes gradually
more moderate and the prices will not have a significant
effect on average inflation of 2006.
The simulation results do not include the impact on
expectations. These effects may be particularly impor-
tant in a small, open economy, where adaptation to a
stable low-inflation environment has not been fully com-
pleted or is quite fragile, in light of the country’s infla-
tion history. On the basis of the above factors, the cal-
culated inflationary effects should only be treated as
downside estimates.
Effect on the current account balance
Increasing oil prices may worsen Hungary’s external
equilibrium index (current account balance/GDP) by
more than 0.4 percentage points roughly one and a
half years later. Despite the decline in global demand,
price effects are dominant (imports become more
expensive than exports), since in accordance with our
calculations the (import) demand for Hungarian prod-
ucts will exhibit less of a decline. This is presumably
due to the lower sensitivity of the economies of our
export markets (mainly the European Union and
Russia) to the oil prices (partly owing to their existing
reserves, and partly as a consequence of their more
efficient energy utilisation). Over the longer run (a
period exceeding one year), the export activities of the
58 See in more detail: Zoltán M., Jakab and Mihály András, Kovács (2002) ‘Hungary in the NIGEM model’ (Hungary in the NIGEM model) MNB Working
Paper 3/2002.
59 See in more detail: Zoltán M., Jakab, Mihály András, Kovács, Balázs, Párkányi, Zoltán, Reppa and Gábor, Vadas (2004) ‘The quarterly projection model
(N.E.M.) – Non-technical summary’, MNB 2004, under publication.
Effect of a hypothetical third quarter 2004 oil price shock on the Hungarian economy
Change in annual average indices compared to the baseline; in percentage points
Table 4.13
GDP CPI Current account 
balance / GDP
2004 -0.1 +0.1 -0.2
2005 -0.2 +0.3 -0.4
2006 0.0 0.0 -0.3
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corporate sector will decline to a significantly lower
extent than the price effects, but to a greater degree
than the decline in import demand, which may be
attributed to the considerable amount of lost revenues
due to the worsening terms of trade.
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In developed economies, maintenance of price stability
is considered to be the primary objective of central
banks. The underlying reason for this is the realisation
that inflation causes welfare losses. However, price sta-
bility is generally defined as low, but not a zero inflation
rate. The rationale why positive inflation should prevail
is that very low inflation, approximating zero, reduces
long-term social welfare. This is explained by a number
of factors such as asymmetric nominal rigidities, the risk
of deflation, the necessity of positive nominal interest
rates and statistical measurement bias in the CPI. These
factors were examined in the light of Hungary’s catch-
ing-up status. We sought to find an answer to the ques-
tion of whether or not, owing to the country’s catching-
up status, optimum inflation is higher in Hungary than
the 1–2.5 per cent inflation rate defined as optimum
inflation in developed countries.
The rate of inflation corresponding to price stability
should be higher in Hungary than in developed
economies, due to the Balassa–Samuelson effect.
Relative price changes, expected as a result of the
Balassa–Samuelson effect, may only justify the necessity
of positive inflation if there is a certain degree of down-
ward price rigidity. The reason for this is that inflation
facilitates flexible relative price adjustment. In practice,
Hungary as a small, open economy should allow for not
only downward price rigidity, but also for developments
in the global market prices of tradable goods. Explanation
for this is that, over the long run, only in the case of nom-
inal appreciation can the inflation of tradables prices be
lower in Hungary than abroad.
Downward nominal wage rigidity, and asymmetric
price rigidity resulting from wage rigidity, seems to be
less relevant in Hungary than in developed economies,
which can be ascribed to the very fact that labour pro-
ductivity growth is faster in Hungary than in developed
countries. Distortions in the Hungarian CPI are presum-
ably higher than in most other EU members, which is
attributable primarily to improved quality and a more
significant impact of newly introduced products. The
Hungarian economy can be considered similar to more
developed economies in respect of the other factors,
which therefore do not warrant any differences
between the optimal rates of inflation.
To summarise the above considerations, we estimate
the rate of inflation corresponding to price stability
presumably to be higher than the ECB’s inflation tar-
get. Our calculations suggest that, over the long term,
inflation in the range of 2.3–3.2 per cent can cushion
the costs of deflation and compensate for distortions
in the CPI. In addition, it allows for relative price
adjustments even if Hungarian tradable prices move
broadly in tandem with those of Hungary’s trading
partners and downward price rigidity is assumed.
It should be emphasised, however, that the optimal
inflation rate according to our calculations refers to the
concept of long-term inflation (i.e. over a 15–20 year
horizon), from which the optimal rate of inflation may
depart in the short run in response to a change in the
cyclical position or a supply shock.
4. 9 THE OPTIMAL RATE OF INFLATION IN HUNGARY
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Central banks following an inflation targeting regime
formulate their opinion on the future development of
inflation in light of the changes of economic and mone-
tary trends, and their assessment thereof. The desirable
level of the central bank base rate is determined on this
basis. In most cases, the perception of the future devel-
opment of inflation only changes, if a new piece of
information is published in relation to economic and
monetary trends. Since most of the data required for
decision-making are usually published on a monthly
basis, the logic of direct inflation targeting dictates that
it is not reasonable for the central banking decision-
making bodies to revaluate the state of the economy
and decide over the monetary conditions more fre-
quently at one-month intervals – apart from extraordi-
nary situations.
International practice usually follows the above-men-
tioned concept: most of the central banks in developed
countries make decisions on interest rates of their key
policy instruments on a monthly basis or even more
infrequently. In the case of the European Central Bank,
the governing body making these decisions has bi-
weekly sessions, but since November 2001 it is only
the first session of the month that decides on interest
rates. By decreasing the number of sessions dealing
with monetary policy, on the one hand they wanted to
reduce the insecurity of market participants and to cut
pre-decision speculation, and on the other hand this
allowed for more opportunities during other sessions
to discuss questions not directly related to monetary
policy but to fulfilling their other tasks. The decision-
making body of the central bank of the United States,
the open market committee, has more sessions than
the at least four per year required by law; in fact, they
meet eight times a year and discuss monetary policy
questions at each session. For the Bank of England, the
law requires at least monthly sessions. Consequently,
the monetary policy council responsible for the British
key policy rate usually has a session on the Wednesday
and Thursday following the first Monday of each
month, discussing interest rates at each session. The
decision-making body of the Reserve Bank of Australia
can itself decide over the frequency of their sessions:
they have 11 sessions a year, on the first Tuesday of
each month except for January, discussing interest
rates at each session. The Executive Board of the
Swedish central bank holds three meetings per month,
but only deals with questions relating to the key policy
rate at eight pre-designated sessions. The Canadian
and the New Zealand central banks make decisions on
their key policy rates eight times a year as well. One
session per month is characteristic of the central banks
of the central European region to determine policy
rates. The decision-making body meets weekly in the
case of the Czech central bank and bi-weekly in the
case of the Slovakian central bank, but they both
change the key policy rates at the last session of the
month. The decision-making body of the Polish central
bank has monthly sessions, discussing monetary policy
questions on each occasion.
4. 10 ON THE TIMING OF INTEREST RATE DECISIONS
Schedule of sessions of the monetary policy decision-making bodies in the examined countries
Table 4.14
Central bank Monetary decision-making body Number of rate-setting
meetings
European Central Bank Governing Council 12
Federal Reserve (United States) Open Market Committee 8
Bank of England (United Kingdom) Monetary Policy Committee 12
Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden) Executive Board 8
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (New Zealand) Governor 8
Bank of Canada (Canada) Governing Council 8
Reserve Bank of Australia (Australia) Reserve Bank Board 11
National Bank of Poland (Poland) Monetary Policy Council 12
Czech National Bank (Czech Republic) CNB Board 12
National Bank of Slovakia (Slovakia) Bank Board 12
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According to a resolution adopted at its session on 5
July 2004, the MNB’s Monetary Council established a
session schedule in line with the above-described inter-
national practice. Starting with this session – if possible
– the Monetary Council will only make decisions on
changing the central bank base rate at its second ses-
sion of the month. During their first monthly meeting
they intend to discuss other questions pertaining to the
tasks and responsibilities of the central bank.
For the MNB the inflation targeting regime is supple-
mented by its commitment to maintain the exchange
rate band. The commitment to the band may require
more frequent discussion of monetary policy-related
questions in certain cases, therefore, also in line with
international practice, the Council may decide on
changing the base rate any time between sessions as
well, if necessitated by developments.
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